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Inconceivable?
Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment
Katherine Pratt
Something to live for came to the place,
Something to die for maybe,
Something to give even sorrow a grace,
And yet it was only a baby.1
I. Introduction.
Each year, more than a million Americans receive medical treatment for 
infertility.2  This article addresses one of the financial aspects of fertility treatment, 
specifically the taxation of fertility treatment costs.  Most medical insurance policies do 
not cover fertility treatment.3  As a result, infertile patients are forced to bear fertility 
treatment costs themselves.  Infertile patients may, however, be able to recoup some of 
these expenses by deducting their fertility treatment costs as medical expenses or having 
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1
 Harriett Prescott Spofford, Only, in THE HOME BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 53 (1967), 
reprinted in DEBRA BRIDWELL, THE ACHE FOR A CHILD 22 (1994) [hereinafter THE ACHE FOR A 
CHILD]. Poetry is included in this article in order to convey the intensity of the emotions surrounding 
infertility and child-bearing. “Poetry is the art of letting the primordial word resound through the 
common word.” THE RAG AND BONE SHOP OF THE HEART (Robert Bly et al., eds. 1992) 182 
(quoting Gerhart Hauptman).
2 THE STAFF OF RESOLVE, THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOC., RESOLVING INFERTILITY 3 (1999) 
[hereinafter RESOLVING INFERTILITY].  The American Society of Reproductive Medicine website, at
www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited July 24, 2003) indicates that about 10 percent of the 
reproductive age population in the U.S. (about 6 million people) is affected by infertility.  
3
 Thomas D. Flanigan, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Insurance under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777 (1999-2000); see also RESOLVING 
INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 296 (describing insurance policy language that excludes fertility 
treatment from coverage). On the other hand, some specific diseases that can cause infertility, such as 
endometriosis, require treatment even if the patient is not trying to have a child, so insurance policies 
often cover this type of treatment. A small number of states have enacted statutes that require 
insurance coverage of high-tech fertility treatments. The website of RESOLVE, a non-profit 
organization that addresses infertility issues, describes the scope of mandated insurance coverage in 
these states.  www.resolve.org/advocacy updates/RESOLVE Fact Sheet and List of Current State 
Insurance Mandates (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
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their fertility treatment expenses reimbursed through a medical flexible spending 
account.4
Although many fertility patients assume that all of their fertility treatment costs 
are medical expenses, for tax purposes,5 the classification of some fertility treatment costs 
as medical expenses is controversial.6  There are no reported cases that address the issue.  
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently issued a private letter ruling in which it 
classified certain fertility treatment expenses as medical expenses.7  On the other hand, 
the IRS challenged a taxpayer’s deduction of certain fertility treatment costs in a case it 
litigated, but that case settled so there was no reported decision.8
During an exchange among tax professors on a law professor list service, a noted 
tax scholar argued that fertility treatment costs are not medical expenses because fertility 
treatment is a “lifestyle choice,” not health care.  The professor said, “I suppose 
reproduction is a bodily function, but it is one the exercise of which is purely optional -- a 
lifestyle choice.” 9  On the other hand, when asked about the tax treatment of the costs of 
Viagra, the professor said that Viagra costs are distinguishable and may qualify for the 
medical expense deduction.10
Another noted tax scholar took the position that the costs of both fertility 
treatment and Viagra should not be deductible as medical expenses, because, in his view, 
4
 I.R.C. §§ 213 and 105 (2000).  The § 213 medical expense deduction and the § 105(b) medical 
flexible spending account reimbursement exclusion provide for the tax treatment of certain “medical 
expenses,” as defined in § 213.  The issue discussed in this article is whether fertility treatment costs 
are deductible under § 213 or excludable under §105 as medical expenses.  References to § 213 
deductibility in this article apply equally to § 105 reimbursability.
5
 Kristin Davis, The Agonizing Price of Infertility, KIPLINGER’S PERSONAL FINANCE MAGAZINE, 
May 1996, at 50 [hereinafter Price of Infertility].
6
 Two brief articles have considered the issue of deductibility under current law.  James E. Maule, 
Federal Tax Consequences of Surrogate Motherhood, 60 TAXES 656 (Sept. 1982); Mark Reid & 
Daphne Main, Tax Issues Surrounding Assisted Reproduction Expenses, 78 TAXES 26 (2000). The 
issue has never been addressed in a law review article. 
7
 Private Letter Ruling 200318017 (January 9, 2003) (available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts, document 
number 2003 TNT 86-12 (May 5, 2003))(egg donor expenses and related costs are medical 
expenses).
8
 Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, LEXIS 94 PTT 13-53 (U.S. Tax Court filed June 7, 
1994) (IRS argued that surrogacy expenses are not medical expenses).  
9
 E-mail submission from Professor Joseph Dodge, Florida State University College of Law, to 
Taxprof, a closed Internet discussion group for tax law professors at AALS-accredited law schools 
(Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with author).
10 Id.
Viagra does pose an interesting issue, namely whether outlays to overcome the 
effects of aging should be viewed as repairs. . . . The “repair” idea  . . . 
presupposes a baseline or norm. Outlays to “improve” one’s body probably 
shouldn’t count as medical expenses, at least in principle. . . .  In the case of 
Viagra, “ED” apparently does not effect geezers exclusively. So it might be a 
“repair” for some, an “improvement” for some, and in the grey zone for many.
Id.
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reproductive dysfunction and sexual dysfunction do not involve the sort of catastrophic 
losses that justify a medical expense deduction.11
This article will consider whether the costs of fertility treatment are deductible 
under current tax law and whether they should be.  Along the way, this article will also 
consider similarities between the costs of treatment for reproductive dysfunction, the 
costs of treatment for sexual dysfunction, and the costs of medical care that permit 
reproductive choice. 
Part II discusses the experience of infertility, including the emotional distress 
caused by infertility, the medical treatment of infertility, and the financial burdens of 
fertility treatment.  Part III explores the tax treatment of fertility treatment costs under 
current law, first for medical care that does not involve third parties, then for the 
additional costs of procedures involving donors and surrogates.  Part IV considers 
whether, given the existence of a medical expense deduction, fertility treatment costs 
should be treated as medical expenses or as non-medical expenses. The thesis of this 
article is that fertility treatment expenses, like the costs of medical care that facilitate 
reproductive choice and the costs of treating sexual dysfunction, should be treated as 
medical expenses because of the vital importance of reproductive and sexual functioning 
to most people.
II. The Experience of Infertility.
A. The extreme emotional distress caused by infertility.
Most people want to have children at some point in their lives.12  This does not mean 
that every person should want to have children.  In addition, even people who want to have 
11
 E-mail submission from Professor Calvin Johnson, The University of Texas School of Law, to 
Taxprof, a closed Internet discussion group for tax law professors at AALS-accredited law schools 
(Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with author).
The only legitimate reason for allowing a tax deduction is that the taxpayer has 
lost the money and is poorer.  The intellectual case for giving deductions to 
subsidize good people or good things is essentially trivial.  Giving out real money 
is a far better idea, primarily because everyone knows it is real money when they 
talk about it, and they distribute the money more sanely. The only rationale for a 
medical deduction is that medical expenses are not consumption but inherent 
losses. You are no better off spending $10,000 for a broken leg because the 
combination of break and expense leave you not improved. They took cosmetic 
surgery out of section 213 because it did not fit the core idea. It is difficult to see 
how a childless couple has a loss by acquiring a child by high tech means that 
wipes out the benefit of the expense. Children are not losses or deductions. . . . 
Children are God's gift to parents and they leave you way ahead, even after 
counting every dime of cost. High technology reproduction hits me as obviously 
distinct from expenses to cure disease or breaks. Children are neither a broken 
leg nor a disease.
Id. 
12
 Only a small percentage of married women decide not to have children.  Lewis J. Lord et al., 
Desperately Seeking Baby; Ten Million Americans Are Struggling To Have Children, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 5, 1987, at 58 (“Only 2 percent of married women actually prefer to be 
childless”).  
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children want to be able to decide when to have their children.  Reproductive choice is 
highly personal.  The point here is that the desire to have children is pervasive, although not 
universal.  
Professor Calvin Johnson argues that the medical expense deduction is for losses 
incurred to try to get the taxpayer back to a baseline of health; bearing a child makes the 
taxpayer better off, so fertility treatment does not fit the rationale for the medical expense 
deduction.13  In his view, “children are neither a broken leg nor a disease.”14 On the other 
hand, the vast majority of couples can conceive and bear children without fertility treatment, 
so fertility treatment just gets the taxpayers back to where the taxpayers would have been 
absent the medical infertility.  It is not the child that is the loss; it is the infertility that is the 
loss. The goal of the medical treatment is to restore the taxpayers to the normal state of 
being able to bear a child if they want one.
Infertility is a loss, just as a broken leg is a loss. Couples usually assume that they 
will not have any trouble having children when they want to have them. The reality of 
infertility comes as a shock to them. As one infertile patient has observed, “[f]inding out 
that you are infertile can feel like suddenly discovering a limb is paralyzed.”15
13
 E-mail submission from Professor Calvin Johnson, The University of Texas School of Law, to 
Taxprof, a closed Internet discussion group for tax law professors at AALS-accredited law schools 
(Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with author).
14 Id.
15 THE ACHE FOR A CHILD, supra note 1, at 93-94:
What if for instance, a woman on her way out the door in the morning, 
reached out to pick up a glass of orange juice and found her arm wouldn't 
move.  Imagine her shock.  She thinks, That's strange, maybe I just need 
to think about what I'm doing.  She concentrates and tries again.  Nothing 
happens.  She's confused because she's never had any reason to doubt 
that her arm would work.  The cold fear of something dreadfully wrong 
settles on her.  She sees a doctor and goes through years of test and 
treatments.  All the doctor can tell her is that she might never regain the 
use of her arm, but there is always the chance that it might spontaneously 
heal sometime in the future if she keeps trying to use it.
Each time she thinks of using her arm, a small persistent hope 
rises in her -- maybe this time it will work.  But each time it fails her 
hopes are crushed.  Meanwhile, she looks no different to the outside 
world.  People are confused when she stops coming to the volleyball 
games or won't shake hands.
When she finally ventures to tell some friends about her 
disability, she hears a lack of understanding: "well at least you have your 
other arm," or "at least it's not life-threatening." . . .  She will have to go 
through a myriad of feelings on her own as she sorts through and realigns 
herself to her new reality without the use of her arm.  Before she adjusts, 
the shock and fear will probably turn into questioning, anger, feelings of 
vulnerability, and deep sadness. . . . 
With an infertile person, the part of his or her body that would 
make a baby or hold a baby until it can be born is that part that is 
disabled.  To varying degrees, we go through this same type of grief and 
reassessment process as we adjust to the reality that part of our body is 
not working and what that means to our self-image and life plans.
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Long-term treatment of infertility extracts a heavy toll, both emotionally and 
financially:
[I]nfertility involves multiple losses.  From the first moment that an 
individual or couple realizes that they are having difficulty conceiving or 
carrying a child, they are confronted with loss.  As the experience of 
infertility continues, many losses come cascading towards them: loss of 
self-esteem, loss of body integrity, loss of privacy, loss of sexual pleasure, 
loss of time, loss of money, [and] loss of comfort in friendships and family 
relationships. . . .16
Infertility often has a devastating emotional effect, especially for women.17  In 
numerous psychological studies, researchers have found that infertile women frequently 
suffer from severe depression.18  In a famous study, researchers found that infertile 
Id.
16 SUSAN LEWIS COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: 
SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 17 (1998) [hereinafter CHOOSING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION].   The authors also note that infertility and the treatment of it can imperil the 
infertile patient’s marriage, relationships with others, and career.  Id.  Another author compares the 
stresses of infertility to the stresses of a chronic illness.  These include the stresses associated with: 
“dealing with the schedules of doctor’s appointments and medication, operations and uncomfortable 
procedures, the side effects of drugs, the emotional energy spent working through fears and grief, and 
needing to adjust to a different reality than [the intended parents] had planned.”  THE ACHE FOR A 
CHILD, supra note 1, at 129.  
17 CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 17-18.  
The observation that women and men experience infertility in different 
ways is something that has long been known by infertile couples and their 
caregivers.  This phenomenon has been studied by several researchers.  
Women have been found to experience significantly more psychological 
distress than do their partners, especially in the areas of depression, anxiety, 
cognitive disturbance and hostility.  Researchers suggest that these findings 
can best be explained by differences in expectations about motherhood and 
fatherhood.
For many [women], the threatened loss of pregnancy and childbirth 
represents an immense loss.  They report having looked forward for many 
years to growing a baby inside them – to feeling its movements within their 
womb and experiencing its birth during labor and delivery.  Some find the 
thought that they might never have this experience unfathomable: it fills 
them with a profound sadness.  Thus, for some women pregnancy feels like 
an essential life event, one that cannot be missed.
Id. Most of the psychological literature on the experience of infertility is about women’s experience 
of infertility.  
18 See, e.g., Alice Domar et al., The Prevalence and Predictability of Depression in Infertile Women, 
58(6) FERTILITY & STERILITY 1158 (Dec. 1992); I. Laffont & R.J. Edelman, Psychological Aspects 
of In Vitro Fertilization: A Gender Comparison, 15(2) J. OF PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 85 (1994); M.P. Lukse & N.A. Vacc, Grief, Depression, and Coping in Women 
Undergoing Infertility Treatment, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245 (Feb. 1999); Anna 
Hjelmstedt et al., Gender Differences in Psychological Reactions to Infertility Among Couples 
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women’s scores on the Beck Depression Index (a test used to measure severity of 
depression) were comparable to the scores of patients with terminal diseases like 
cancer.19
Infertility causes grief in men as well, but men sometimes feel constrained in their 
expression of grief.  Here is the story of one grieving man:
I'll always love the ones we lost.  Every time we had a miscarriage, I 
thought it would be easier if somebody would just take [my] arm or leg so 
I could have a child. . . . The sadness hit so deep [I] couldn't sleep.  It was 
blacker than black.  When you're that low, there's not much anybody can 
do or say.20
Many infertile patients report that infertility has been “the most upsetting 
experience of their lives.”21  Infertile patients repeatedly experience a cycle of hope for a 
child and loss of their hoped-for child.22  Infertile patients report that their hoped-for 
child exists on an emotional level even if the child is never physically conceived.23  The
Seeking IVF- and ICSI-treatment, 78 ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 42 
(1999).
19
 Domar, supra note 18, at 1158. One patient reports her surprise at the depth of her despair: 
“What surprised me about the grief was the way it kept blindsiding me when I least expected it.  
A day . . . would start with no great emotional load, but a word or a song would set me off, and I . 
. . I couldn't control my sobbing -- not crying -- uncontrollably sobbing.” THE ACHE FOR A 
CHILD, supra note 1, at 95.
20 THE ACHE FOR A CHILD, supra note 1, at 146.
21
 In one study, 50 percent of women and 15 percent of men being treated for infertility reported that 
infertility has been “the most upsetting experience of their lives.”   Ellen W. Freeman et al., 
Psychological Evaluation and Support in a Program of In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 
43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 48, 50 (Jan. 1985).
22 THE ACHE FOR A CHILD, supra note 1, at 94-95:
Those unable to conceive a child do not experience a clean grief because 
the loss happens over an extended period of time as a monthly cycle of 
hope and grief.  This cycle includes the losses of: privacy, sense of 
control, having grandchildren, purpose, time, money, career progress, 
innocence, giving to another, being needed, and the acquired credibility 
of being an adult who has raised children.  This is why many women 
view infertility as the most upsetting experience of their lives.
Id.
23 JOHN C. JARRETT, II & DEIDRA T. RAUSCH, THE FERTILITY GUIDE: A COUPLES HANDBOOK FOR 
WHEN YOU WANT TO HAVE A BABY (MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE) 37, 38 (1998) [hereinafter THE 
FERTILITY GUIDE].  The following poem, Uncharted Territory, captures this common experience:
How can I say good-bye,
When we’ve not yet said hello?
My “Imagined Child” – will you ever come to be?
From early years the future was guaranteed – now
I wonder, “Will this dream be realized?”
Carefree and assured, we started our lives together;
Tentative and unsure, will we forever fear the future?
The pathway to you is uncertain,
The questions unanswerable.
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feelings of loss experienced by infertile patients are real and recurrent, even though most 
people find them difficult to comprehend.24
The failure of most people to understand the anguish of infertile patients adds to 
patients’ feelings of isolation.25  In addition, infertile patients have to deal with the 
stresses of their medical treatment, which have been likened to the stresses of being 
treated for a chronic illness.26
As the journey continues, filled with evaluation of
uncharted territory, my vision of you remains constant.
My peace is found in knowing that while I may not
hold you in my arms, I will always hold you in my heart.
Id. at unnumbered page 3 after the title page.
24 THE ACHE FOR A CHILD, supra note 1, at 128-29:
The stress of infertility can be enormous.  Along with the general 
grieving process, there is the emotional stress of the constant cycle of 
hope and despair.  One infertile woman dealt with this by never 
accepting an invitation to a child-oriented function until she checked her 
calendar.  If the event were scheduled for day 16 of her cycle, when she 
would have just ovulated she would accept, but if it were scheduled for 
day 2, after her period might have started, she declined.
On the good days, there is just a mild tug at your heart; then there 
are the bad days when the pain is uncontrollable, and it's hard to function at 
all.  In dealing with this roller coaster of stress and also the physical stress 
of medical testing and treatment, we may find we don't have much energy 
left over to deal with the rest of life. 
Id.
25
 Alice D. Domar & Machelle M. Seibel, Emotional Aspects of Infertility, in INFERTILITY: A 
COMPREHENSIVE TEXT 24 (Machelle M. Seibel ed. 1990); Sandra R. Leiblum et al., Unsuccessful In 
Vitro Fertilization: A Follow-Up Study, 4 J. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 46, 49 
(1987); Sandy Banks, ‘Last’ Chance for Couples Frustrated by Infertility, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 
2001, Part 5 at 1.  
26 THE ACHE FOR A CHILD, supra note 1, at 128-29:
Infertility brings day-to-day stresses that are similar to living with a chronic illness: 
dealing with the schedule of doctor's appointments and medication, operations and 
uncomfortable medical procedures, the side effects of drugs, the emotional energy 
spent in working through fears and grief, and needing to adjust to a different reality 
than we had planned.  As in the case of chronic illness, we keep hoping for a 
miracle turnaround, and that may happen, but it isn't something we can count on.  
All of this can eventually lead to exhaustion.
Id.
In the words of an infertile woman:
I completely withdrew from the whole world for a while. . . . I had a hard time 
being around anybody.  I would pretty much stay at home.  I had a hard time 
going back to work.  I was scared to face everybody there.  Each day was a 
challenge.  There were many days that I left work crying.  My arms literally 
ached, and I felt so empty.  I didn't want to cook or clean.  I left the house dark.  I 
wasn't sleeping, so the doctor prescribed sleeping pills.  I would take a sleeping 
pill and end up crying myself to sleep every night.26
Id. at 103.
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Infertility deprives would-be parents of an “experience that is central to . . . 
identity and meaning in life.”27 As Lori Andrews and Lisa Douglass have noted, “the 
lengths to which [infertile patients] will go to conceive a child attest to the intensity of the 
pain of infertility.”28  The following poem about infertility captures the elemental despair 
infertile patients experience:
Oh, many’s the time in the evening
  When the light has fled o’er the sea,
That I dream alone in the gloaming
  Of the joys that are not for me;
And oft in my sorrowful bosom
  Swells up the mother-love flame,
And I clasp with my arms that are trembling
  My child that never came. . . .
The hours swim on the midnight,
  The moon looks over the hill,
And the u-lu-lu of the night owl
  Sinks mournfully and shrill;
The solitude aches with rapture,
  And my heart with the mother-love flame
As I sing alone in the gloaming
  To the child that never came.29
27 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 11 (1994).
28
 Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Symposium on Biomedical Technology and Health Care: 
Social and Conceptual Transformations: Technical Article: Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 623, 629 (1991).
29
 Ella Rhoads Higginson, The Childless Mother’s Lullaby, in A BOOK OF LULLABIES 383 (Elva S. 
Smith ed., 1925).  Here is another expression of an infertile woman’s despair:
So many times, I’ve waited,
Hoped,
Believed,
That God and nature
Would perform
A miracle
Incredible but common,
Nothing grew.
And oftentimes I feel
The mystery of life and growth
Is known to all but me,
Or that reality
Is not as it appears to be. . . .
Margaret Rampton Munk, Mother’s Day, reprinted in ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, EXPERIENCING 
INFERTILITY 152-53 (revised ed. 1998).
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B. The medical treatment of infertility.
Infertility is “a disease or condition affecting the reproductive system that 
interferes with the ability of a man or woman to achieve a pregnancy or of a woman to 
carry a pregnancy to live birth.”30 There are many causes of infertility. Male factors and 
female factors each account for about a third of infertility cases.31  Infertility is 
attributable to a combination of male and female factors in about 10 percent of infertility 
cases.32  In about 20 percent of infertility cases, the infertility is “unexplained” (i.e., it 
cannot be diagnosed).33
Male factors include: (1) disorders related to sperm production, maturation, or 
transfer, including varicocele (testicular varicose veins);34 (2) blocked or absent vas 
deferens (the tube that connects the testes and the urethra); and (3) absent or retrograde 
ejaculation.35  These problems can be caused by a variety of factors, including: hormonal 
imbalances; genetic disorders; environmental factors; anatomical defects; sexually 
transmitted diseases; spinal cord injuries; and bladder, prostate gland, or testicular cancer 
or surgery.36
Female factors include ovulation disorders, blocked fallopian tubes, cervical 
disorders, endometriosis, and uterine disorders.37  These female factors can be caused by 
a variety of factors, including: hormonal imbalances; autoimmune reactions; genetic 
disorders; anatomical defects (including those caused by in utero exposure to DES38
taken by the patient’s mother); pelvic inflammatory disease, venereal disease, and other 
types of infection; scar tissue; fibroid tumors; and reproductive cancers, including ovarian 
cancer, uterine cancer, and cervical cancer.39
Fertility rates for women decline for women in their thirties and decline 
dramatically for women in their forties,40 due to a combination of several factors, 
including increased rates of: (1) ovarian dysfunction, (2) uterine dysfunction, and (3) 
30 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 5. According to the American Society of Reproductive 
Medicine, infertility is “a disease of the reproductive system that impairs the body’s ability to 
perform the basic functions of reproduction.” “Quick Facts About Infertility” ASRM website at
http://www.asrm.org/patients/faqs/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
31
 ASRM website at http://asrm.org/patients/faqs/Q&A2 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34
 Ten to 15 percent of men may have varicocele and 40-50 percent of men treated for infertility have 
varicocele. RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 165.
35 BRIAN KEARNEY, HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION 14-15 (1998) [hereinafter HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION]. 
36 Id..
37 Id. at 11-14.
38
 During the mid-1900s, many pregnant women took a prescription drug called diethylstilbestrol 
(DES).  Women who, as fetuses, were exposed to DES taken by their mothers can have various types 
of reproductive disorders that cause infertility, including various cervical disorders, various uterine 
disorders, tubal disorders, irregular menstrual cycles, and endometriosis.  In utero exposure to DES 
also increases a woman’s risk of miscarriage and premature delivery. RESOLVING INFERTILITY,
supra note 2, at 136-39.
39 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 11-14; RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 89-
101, 121-145.
40 THE FERTILITY GUIDE, supra note 23, at 37-38.
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chromosomal abnormalities in their eggs.41  During perimenopause (the series of gradual 
hormonal changes that precede menopause), women can still conceive and bear children, 
but are less fertile.42
Infertility has been derisively labeled “the yuppie woman’s disease.”43 The 
stereotype of infertility is the yuppie career woman trying to “have it all,” achieving 
professional success in her thirties, and wanting children in her forties.  Although more 
women, especially professional women, are delaying having children,44 many of the 
female factors listed above are unrelated to age.
Medical treatment of infertility is progressive.  The physician begins fertility 
treatment by taking the patient couple’s45 medical history,46 and conducting physical and 
pelvic examinations.47 If the source of the infertility cannot be determined, based on this 
preliminary evaluation, the doctor selects from a number of tests and procedures.  
41
 There are three basic types of ovulation disorders that are caused by hormonal imbalances, one of 
which is common in older women approaching menopause.  The three types of disorders are: (1) 
hypogonadotropic disorders; (2) hypergonadotropic disorders; and (3) euestrogenic disorders.  FSH 
and LH are both in a class of reproductive hormones called gonadotropins.  The hypothalmus 
generates gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH), which triggers the release of gonadotropins by 
the pituitary gland.  FSH stimulates the growth of egg follicles.  LH stimulates the production of 
estrogen and progesterone.  Rising estrogen levels inhibit the pituitary’s production of FSH.  LH later 
surges to cause the dominant egg follicle to release an egg.  Hypogonadotropic disorders involve low 
blood levels of FSH and LH.  Hypergonadotropic disorders involve high blood levels of FSH and 
LH.  As women approach menopause, their blood levels of FSH and LH increase, so this form of 
ovulation disorder is common in older women patients. HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 
11-14. Younger women (under age 40) with premature ovarian failure (POF) also have this type of 
disorder.  POF can be caused by radiation or chemotherapy treatment for cancer, endometriosis, 
congenital defects, autoimmune disorders, genetics, and environmental factors.  CHOOSING 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 196-97.  Euestrogenic disorders involve gonadotropin 
and estrogen imbalances.  This type of imbalance is most often attributable to polycystic ovarian 
syndrome (PCOS). HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 13.  Older women also have 
increased rates of a uterine disorder called Luteal Phase Defect. RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 
2, at 149.
42 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 14.
43
 Margaret Ann Mille, The Fertility Center of Sarasota is One of About 350 Clinics Nationwide 
Using Technology to Help Women Have Babies; In-vitro Specialists Beget a Fertile Business, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 2000, Business Weekly Section, at 1.
44
 More older women are having children, despite the fact that a woman’s fertility declines with age.  
RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 11, 14.  Since, 1981, the birthrate for 40 to 44-year-old 
women has increased 74 percent.  About 70 percent of the in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycles done in 
1998 were for women between the ages of 30 and 39. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, AMERICAN SOCIETY OR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, & RESOLVE, 2000 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 21, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/ART00/PDF's
/ART2000.pdf (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter 2000 CDC REPORT].
45
 Infertile patients may be in a traditional or nontraditional relationship.  Most infertile patients are 
heterosexual married men and women.  Some patients are unmarried couples, either heterosexual or 
same-sex, and some patients are individuals who plan to be single parents.  For consistency, this 
article will use nomenclature that fits the typical case, unless otherwise noted.
46 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 66-67. 
47 Id. at 67-70. 
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Women patients are frequently asked to generate ovulation records (based on their 
temperature and ovulation indicator tests).  Blood tests indicate whether the woman’s 
hormones are within normal ranges at various times during her cycle.48  Transvaginal 
ultrasound is also used to monitor the woman’s ovulatory cycle.  An X-ray of the 
fallopian tubes and uterus is often ordered to check for blockage of the patient’s fallopian 
tubes and abnormalities in the uterus.49  Women also sometimes have a diagnostic, 
outpatient surgical procedure (a laparoscopy), performed under general anesthesia in the 
hospital, if the doctor suspects that the infertility is caused by certain problems such as 
endometriosis or fibroid tumors.50  The postcoital test is used to determine whether the 
woman’s cervical mucus is normal or abnormal and whether any of the man’s sperm are 
alive and moving.51
Male patients submit a semen sample so the laboratory can evaluate whether each 
of the following is normal or abnormal: (1) the total volume of semen; (2) the sperm 
count; (3) sperm motility and velocity; (4) morphology (maturity, shape, and size of the 
sperm or the sperm head); (5) liquefaction (viscosity of the semen); and (6) seminal 
fructose levels.52  Other semen tests include tests for: (1) infection, such as chlamydia; (2) 
sperm antibodies; and (3) ability of the sperm to penetrate an egg.53  Men also submit 
blood samples so the laboratory can determine whether the man’s hormone levels are 
normal or abnormal.54  A testicular biopsy is also sometimes used to evaluate sperm 
production.55
This infertility workup usually enables the physician to identify and treat specific 
causes of infertility.  For example, endometriosis can be treated with surgery, hormonal  
treatment, or a combination of the two.56 Clomiphene citrate, a moderately priced pill 
taken orally, is often prescribed for certain types of ovulation and uterine disorders.57
These disorders and others can also be treated with various injectable prescription drugs 
that stimulate the ovaries.58  If the woman’s ovaries are being stimulated, the physician 
monitors the cycle with blood tests and transvaginal ultrasounds, in order to determine 
the number of developing follicles and the correct medication dosage and to detect any 
48 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 90-91.  The hormones commonly tested include FSH, 
LH, estrogen (in the form of estradiol), prolactin, progesterone, thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH), 
and adrogens (including the male hormones testosterone and dehydroepiandrosterone sulfate).  Id.
49 Id. at 75-77. This diagnostic X-ray is called a hysterosalpingogram, or HSG. Id. at 75.
50 Id. at 79-80. 
51
 Id. at 75. 
52 Id. at 81-85. 
53 Id. at 85-86. 
54 Id. at 86-87. 
55 Id. at 86. 
56 Id. at 125-28. 
57 Id. at 103-04.  Clomiphene citrate is sold under the brand name Clomid or Serophone.  
Clomiphene citrate is typically administered for five consecutive days during a cycle.  The daily 
dose is one to four 50-milligram pills.  The cost is $10 or less per pill. Id.
58 Id. at 105-10.  These injectable drugs include: (1) FSH (brand names Fertinex, Metrodin, 
Follistim, and Gonal F); (2) human menopausal gonadotropin (brand names Humegon, Pergonal, 
Repronex); (3) human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) (brand names Novarel, Pregny, Profasi); (4) 
gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonists (GnRH agonists) (brand names Lupron and Synarel); 
gonadotropin-releasing hormone antagonist (GnRH antagonist) (brand name Antagon).  Id.
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side effects of the medications.59 Certain male factors can also be treated with surgery or 
hormonal treatment.  For example, varicocele (testicular varicose veins), a common male 
factor, can be surgically repaired.60  Intrauterine insemination (IUI) is used both for some 
female factors and some male factors.61
The vast majority of patients receive conventional drug and surgical treatment.62
If these treatments are not successful, infertile patients sometimes resort to assisted 
reproductive technologies (also known as high-tech fertility treatments), including in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) and procedures that involve third parties, including sperm donors, 
egg donors and surrogates. In IVF procedures, the doctor stimulates the ovaries of the 
intended mother and extracts her eggs when they are mature.63  In an IVF procedure, the 
eggs are fertilized with the intended father’s sperm in a test tube and several days later 
the resulting embryos are implanted in the intended mother’s uterus.64
If the cause of the infertility is a sperm disorder (including low sperm count, poor 
sperm motility, or abnormal sperm morphology), a relatively new technique called 
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) can be used in conjunction with IVF.  In an ICSI 
procedure, an embryologist injects a single sperm into each egg.65  ICSI dramatically 
improves fertilization rates.66  ICSI has been hailed as a “revolutionary” treatment for 
sperm disorders.67
Some couples can only have a child with the help of a sperm donor, egg donor, or 
surrogate.  If the intended father cannot produce healthy sperm, the couple may enlist the 
assistance of a sperm donor.  Couples requiring sperm donation typically use the sperm of 
an anonymous donor from a sperm bank.68  The cost of sperm donation is small because it is 
easy for the donor to provide the sperm sample.69 Donor sperm can be used in an 
59
 The most serious immediate side effect of ovarian stimulation is Ovarian Hyperstimulation 
Syndrome (OHS), which occurs in 1-5 percent of medicated cycles.  OCS requires medical treatment 
and, in the most serious cases, hospitalization. Id. at 114-15.
60 Id. at 166-67.  Surgical repair of varicocele dramatically improves sperm counts, sperm motility, 
and fertility.  Id. at 168.
61 Id. at 145-46, 171.  In an IUI, the man’s sperm is processed to concentrate the best sperm, then 
the physician transfers the sperm into the woman’s uterus using a catheter through the cervix.  Id.
at 145-46.
62
 The ASRM estimates that 85-90 percent of infertile patients are treated with conventional drug and 
surgical treatments. ASRM website at http://www.asrm.org/patients/faqs/Q&A4 (last visited Apr. 3, 
2003).
63 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 178-80.
64 Id. at 180-82.
65 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 117-18.  The first successful ICSI procedure occurred 
in 1992.  It is now a common procedure.  Id. at 115-16.
66 Id. at 118-20.
67 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 186.  One fertility specialist, Dr. Sherman Silber, 
opined: “The development of ICSI has completely revised the way we look at male factor infertility.  
There may soon be virtually no form of male infertility [other than complete absence of the testes] 
that is not amenable to treatment.” HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 115. 
68 CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 180.  Couples sometimes use a known 
sperm donor.  Id. at 211.
69
 The cost of sperm donation is incidental when compared to the cost of egg donation or 
surrogacy, so this article will limit discussion of third-party costs to the egg donor and surrogacy 
fees.
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intrauterine insemination procedure (IUI)70 or in an IVF procedure. Sperm banks test donors 
for sexually transmitted diseases at the time of donation and again six months later.  The 
sperm is frozen until the second test has been completed.
If the intended mother cannot produce healthy eggs, the intended parents can 
arrange for an egg donor to give them eggs.  An egg donor procedure is like an IVF 
procedure, except that the doctor stimulates the egg donor’s ovaries instead of the 
intended mother’s ovaries, and extracts the donor’s eggs when they are mature; the 
resulting embryos are implanted in the intended mother’s uterus.71 Couples enlisting the 
assistance of an egg donor may know the donor or may find the donor through an 
agency.72 There is a shortage of egg donors; many fertility clinics have long waiting lists 
for couples who want donated eggs.73
If the intended mother can produce eggs, but cannot gestate the child, the intended 
parents can arrange for a surrogate to gestate the child. The intended mother’s ovaries are 
stimulated, the eggs are extracted and fertilized, and the resulting embryos are implanted in 
the uterus of a surrogate, who carries and bears the child for the intended parents.74  If the 
intended mother cannot produce healthy eggs or carry the child, the intended parents can 
either arrange for: (1) a donor to give them eggs, which are fertilized, and implanted in the 
uterus of a surrogate who carries and bears the child; or (2) a surrogate to both provide the 
eggs and gestate the child.75
The next section will consider the cost of these treatments and the effect on the 
infertile patient.
70
 IUI with donor sperm is commonly referred to as donor insemination (DI). RESOLVING 
INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 267.
71 Id. at 273.
72
 Intended parents often use known egg donors but only rarely use known sperm donors.  CHOOSING 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 211.  About 20 percent of egg donors are known and 80
percent are anonymous.  RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 277. Known egg donors typically 
do not want to be compensated for being a donor. Anonymous donors are paid fees that average 
around $3,500. See infra note 85. The fees for egg donation are higher than the fees for sperm 
donation because the process of donating eggs is more time consuming, more elaborate, more 
uncomfortable, and riskier than the process of donating sperm. CHOOSING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 209. In addition, sperm can be frozen and stored, but donated eggs 
cannot be frozen and stored. Id. at 211-12. The screening of egg donors is also much more elaborate 
than the screening of sperm donors. Id. at 180-83, 230.
73 CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 212.
74 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 280. 
75
 Surrogates are typically paid a fee. The fee varies and can range from $10,000 to $25,000, with 
additional amounts paid for carrying multiples.  Janet Zimmerman, Path to Parenthood: An 
Inland Woman Steps In as a Surrogate to Help Other Couples Have Children, PRESS ENTERPRISE 
(Riverside, CA), June 23, 2002, at E01 (surrogates are paid about $20,000); Brian M. Schleter, 
The Business of Babies, THE CAPITAL (Annapolis, MD), August 6, 2001, at A1 (surrogate fee is 
$10,000 to $25,000); Liz Doup, The New Extended Family, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, 
FL), April 6, 2003, at 1E (typical surrogate fee is $15,000 to $18,000, with extra compensation 
for carrying multiple fetuses).
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C. The cost of medical treatment for infertility.
Financial pressures add additional stress to fertility treatment.  Some fertility 
treatment is moderately priced, but other fertility treatment is very expensive.   Consider 
the costs of several of the most common fertility treatments.  The cost of clomiphene 
citrate for one month of treatment is usually between $60 and $200.76  An IUI procedure 
usually costs a few hundred dollars.77  Surgery to open a woman’s blocked fallopian 
tubes costs $10,000 to $15,000.78  The costs of injectable ovarian stimulation drugs for
one month of treatment can total several thousand dollars.79  Surgery to repair varicocele
(testicular varicose veins) typically costs $5,000 to $8,000.80  In many cases, 
conventional treatments enable the couple to have a child, but if various conventional 
treatments do not work, couples sometimes try assisted reproductive technologies.
Assisted reproductive technologies are very expensive.81  The cost of a single IVF 
procedure is typically around $10,000, and infertile patients often do numerous 
procedures.82  ICSI adds about $2,500 to the cost of a single IVF cycle.83  In egg donor 
and surrogacy procedures, the intended parents incur additional expenses,84 the largest of 
which is the fee paid to the egg donor or surrogate.  An egg donor’s fee is typically in the 
$3,000 to $5,000 range, but a small number of egg donors receive a higher fee.85  The fee 
for surrogates also varies, but is usually in the $10,000 to $25,000 range.86
76
 Patients take one to four pills for five days.   The cost for one pill a day is $15 to $50. RESOLVING 
INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 104.
77 Price of Infertility, supra note 5, at 50. 
78
 Vickie Chachere, “Test Tube” Babies Began 20 Years Ago, TAMPA TRIB., Jul. 25, 1998 
(Nation/World section), at 1.
79 JOAN LIEBMAN-SMITH ET AL., THE UNOFFICIAL GUIDE TO OVERCOMING INFERTILITY 320 (1999) 
[hereinafter, UNOFFICIAL GUIDE]
80
 Chachere, supra note 78.
81
 Assisted reproductive technology expenses include: (1) the costs of various prescription drugs, 
including the drugs that are used to stimulate the ovaries of the intended mother or egg donor; (2) the 
costs of medical supervision of the stimulation, including the costs of ultrasound monitoring of the 
developing eggs; and (3) the hospital, lab, and doctor fees for the egg extraction and implantation.  
UNOFFICIAL GUIDE,  supra note 79, at 315-20.
82 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 303; Price of Infertility, supra note 5, at 50. 
83 Price of Infertility, supra note 5, at 50. 
84
 These expenses include the fees paid to: (1) the agency that represents the donor or surrogate; (2) 
legal counsel to represent the donor or surrogate; (3) a psychologist to evaluate and counsel the donor 
or surrogate; and (4) the donor or surrogate.  UNOFFICIAL GUIDE,  supra note 79, at 320.
85
 Donors have been offered fees as high as $100,000.  See, e.g., Marilee Enge, Ad Seeks Donor Eggs 
for $100,000, Possible New High, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2000, at N3 (describing full-page 
advertisements that were run in the Stanford campus newspaper); Kenneth R. Weiss, Eggs Buy a 
College Education, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2001 at A1 (with photographs of advertisements offering 
up to $100,000 to potential donors).  Very few donors are paid such high fees; fees of $3,500 or less 
are more common.  Id. at 30, 31. 
86 See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 75, at E01 (surrogates are paid about $20,000); Schleter, supra 
note 75, at A1 (surrogate fee is $10,000 to $25,000); Erica Noonan, Breathing Life Into Hopes For A 
Family: Rare Lung Disease Won't Derail Goal, BOSTON GLOBE, April 13, 2003, Globe Northwest 
Section, at 1 (cost of surrogacy procedure to overcome infertility can exceed $40,000).
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Insurance does not usually cover fertility treatments per se,87 although insurance 
may pay for treatment of certain disorders, such as endometriosis, that can cause 
infertility.88  Fertility patients therefore must pay for most of their fertility treatment.  
Patients are willing to spend vast sums of money to increase their chances of conceiving 
and bearing a child, even though two in five are never able to conceive and bear a child.89
Patients often spend more than $30,000 for treatment.90
This willingness to pay large amounts for fertility treatment creates intense 
financial pressures for infertile patients.  Patients often have to defer any non-medical 
expenses they can.91  In addition, patients may rely more heavily on less expensive 
treatments, like IUI after ovulation induction with clomiphene, even though that 
treatment is not effective for certain types of infertility problems.92  Patients also 
sometimes proceed with whatever type of care is covered by their insurance, even if, 
compared to IVF,  that care is more invasive and less effective in dealing with their 
infertility problem.93  For example, where insurance covers the tubal surgeries but not 
IVF, a woman with blocked fallopian tubes may have several tubal surgeries to try to 
repair the tubes, instead of bypassing the tubes with IVF.  The financial pressures cause 
strain over time.94
87
 Insurance contracts often specifically exclude fertility treatment from coverage .
88
 Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL'Y & L. 1215, 1217-18 (1997).
89 Id. at 1223.  Neumann cites studies in which survey respondents indicated that they would pay 
very large sums to increase their chances of having a child.  For example, he cites a U.K. study in 
which survey respondents indicated that they “were willing to pay 29 percent of their after-tax 
income for a 50 percent chance of having a child and willing to risk a 20 percent chance of death in 
order to have a child.”  Id. at 1224.
90 Price of Infertility, supra note 5, at 50.
91 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 305. In order to fund their care, they may rent rather 
than buy a home, defer purchases like furniture or cars, not take expensive vacations, dip into 
retirement savings, or borrow from family or friends.  Id. at 305-306.
92 Id. (Multiple cycles of IUI with blocked fallopian tubes are “a waste.”)  The staff of RESOLVE 
note, in their book:
It is tempting to make dollar-based decisions, especially if your budget is already 
strained.  It is more important to look at what you get when you write that check 
however.  The least expensive alternatives may not turn out to be the least effective.  
If they work for you, great.  But if they do not, the costs can quickly add up to equal 
or exceed what you would have paid for more expensive, although more effective 
treatment.  It is a lesson many people learn the hard way.
Id. at 304. 
93 Id. .
94 Id. at 306.
[Evi] estimates her current pregnancy has cost more than $60,000 so far.  “We 
don’t have much furniture in our house and we don’t take vacations.  But it’s 
been very trying, very difficult.  Now that I’m pregnant, we have no problems in 
our relationship.  Before, we fought all the time about the infertility, mostly about 
the money.
Id.
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Taxpayers may be able to recoup some of their fertility treatment costs under the 
tax code.  Part III will consider whether fertility treatment costs are deductible or 
reimbursable under current law.  
III. The Tax Treatment of Fertility Treatment Costs under Current Law.
A. The tax treatment of medical expenses.
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 262 provides that taxpayers generally may not 
deduct personal expenses.95 Section 213 provides, however, that taxpayers can deduct their 
expenses for medical care (i.e., care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent) to the extent 
those expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.96 For example, assume that a 
taxpayer in the 35 percent tax rate bracket has $100,000 of adjusted gross income and 
$17,500 of medical expenses. The taxpayer can deduct $10,000 of the medical expenses 
because the $17,500 of medical expenses exceed $7,500 (7.5 percent of the $100,000 of 
adjusted gross income) by $10,000. That deduction reduces the taxpayer’s taxable income 
by $10,000, which saves the taxpayer $3,500 in taxes.
Taxpayers who participate in medical flexible spending accounts are reimbursed for 
their medical expenses.97  The reimbursements from medical flexible spending accounts are 
funded by pre-tax deductions from the participants’ income, so the participation in the 
medical flexible spending account allows the participants to pay medical expenses out of 
pre-tax dollars.  For example, assume that a taxpayer in the 35 percent tax rate bracket 
participates in her employer’s medical flexible spending account. The taxpayer’s annual 
contributions to the account are capped at $5,000. The employer periodically withholds 
funds from the taxpayer’s paycheck in order to fund the $5,000 amount in the taxpayer’s 
95
 I.R.C. § 262 (2000). 
96
 I.R.C. § 213 (2000).  Taxpayers with large medical expenses may be subject to the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT).  Taxpayers compute their tax liability both under the regular income tax 
and the AMT and pay whichever tax liability is higher.  I.R.C. § 55(a) (2000).  The base of the
AMT, “alternative minimum taxable income” (AMTI), is broader than under the regular income 
tax. I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(2), 56-58 (2000).  The AMT tax rate for individuals is 26 percent on the first 
$175,000 of the “taxable excess” and 28 percent of the “taxable excess” over $175,000. I.R.C. § 
55(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).  The “taxable excess” is AMTI less an exemption amount ($45,000 for 
married couples filing jointly and $33,750 for single filers, with the exemption amount being 
phased out at higher AMTI).  I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(2), (d)(1), and (d)(3) (2000) (amended 
2001). For purposes of the regular income tax, medical expenses can be deducted only to the 
extent they exceed 7.5 percent of the taxpayer’s Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). For purposes of 
the AMT, medical expenses can be deducted only to the extent they exceed 10 percent of the 
taxpayer’s Adjusted Gross Income (AGI).  I.R.C. §56(b)(1)(B) (2000).
In Klaassen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 182 F. 3d 932 (10th Cir. 1999), 
taxpayers with AGI of $83,056.42, many children, and medical expenses were subject to the 
AMT.  The taxpayers, a husband and wife, had ten dependents and claimed twelve personal 
exemptions on their tax return.  They also had total medical expenses of $10,996.  Of that 
amount, they deducted $4,767 ($10,996 medical expenses less $6,229, which is 7.5 percent of 
$83,056 AGI).  Under the regular income tax, they owed $5,111.  Under the AMT, they owed an 
additional $1,085, in part because their medical expense deduction, for purposes of the AMT, was 
only $2,690 ($10,996 medical expenses less $8,306, which is 10 percent of $83,056 AGI).
97
 I.R.C. § 105 (2000).
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flexible spending account. After the taxpayer pays $5,000 of medical expenses, she is 
reimbursed that amount out of the account. The $5,000 of pay that is withheld and 
contributed to the flexible spending account is not taxed, which saves the taxpayer $1,750 
(35 percent of the $5,000 of pay excluded from income). The reimbursement from the 
medical flexible spending account must be for expenses attributable to “medical care,” as 
that term is defined in section 213.98
B. The characterization of fertility treatment expenses as medical expenses.
 The characterization of some fertility treatment expenses as section 213 medical 
expenses is unsettled.  There are no reported cases that squarely address the issue, and 
IRS administrative pronouncements have reached conclusions that are seemingly 
inconsistent.  In 1957, the IRS ruled that the costs of IUI are not medical expenses.99
Recently, the IRS stated, in a publication for taxpayers about deducting medical 
expenses, that the costs of fertility treatment are medical expenses.100  Even more 
recently, the IRS issued a private letter ruling in which it concluded that the fee paid to an 
egg donor, and the related costs of arranging for the donor, are medical expenses.101  On 
the other hand, the IRS, with the approval of its national office, has taken the position in 
litigation that the costs of surrogacy are not medical expenses.102  The IRS is not bound to 
follow the position it has taken in private letter rulings103 or in taxpayer publications,104
and the single litigated case was settled, so the tax characterization of fertility treatment 
costs as medical expenses is not clear.
1. The definition of medical expenses.
Section 213 provides that medical expenses include costs incurred for “the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of 
affecting any structure or function of the body.” 105 The first prong of this two-part 
98
 I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 125 (2000). The 7.5 percent floor of § 213 does not apply to these 
reimbursements.
99
 Private Letter Ruling 5707244900A (1957 PLR LEXIS 736).
100 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, IRS PUBLICATION 502, MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 
(FOR USE IN PREPARING 2002 RETURNS).
101
 Private Letter Ruling 200318017 (Release Date: January 09, 2003) (available in LEXIS, citation 
2003 TNT 86-12, May 5, 2003).
102
 Sedgwick v. Commissioner, supra note 8.
103
 Private letter rulings may not used or cited as precedent.  I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).  Saltzman notes that 
the IRS sometimes considers such rulings internally, however, to determine its position on an issue.  
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 3.03[3][c] and n. 56 (student ed. 1991).
104 See, e.g., Adler v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964) (language in a taxpayer publication 
does not bar the government from making a contrary argument based on the statutory language in the 
Internal Revenue Code); see also SALTZMAN, supra note 103, at ¶ 3.04[8] (taxpayer publications 
“perform a useful and laudable function” but “may not be relied on by taxpayers in planning future 
transactions”).  Id.
105
 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2000). Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e) tracks this statutory language.  
Prescription drug expenses are treated as medical expenses, but over-the-counter drug expenses are 
not considered to be medical expenses for purposes of § 213. I.R.C. § 213(b) (2000).
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definition is potentially underinclusive if read literally and narrowly, because it might fail 
to characterize as medical expenses the costs of medically treating injuries, conditions 
and defects. The Treasury Department has resolved some of this underinclusiveness 
problem by interpreting the term “disease” broadly to include conditions (including those 
caused by personal injury), impairments, and disorders.106
The potential underinclusiveness of the first prong of the definition is, to some 
extent, offset by the broad second prong of the definition. This second part of the 
definition would correctly characterize as medical expenses the costs of medical 
treatment of a patient’s injuries, conditions, impairments, or disorders. The problem with 
the “structure or function” prong of the medical expense definition is that it is 
overinclusive. For example, read literally, the second part of the section 213 definition 
would even characterize as medical expenses the costs of cosmetic surgery.107
Consistent with this interpretation of section 213, the IRS ruled that the costs of 
cosmetic surgery were medical expenses under the “structure or function” prong of the 
definition.108 Although the IRS was no doubt unhappy about allowing taxpayers to deduct 
the costs of cosmetic surgery as medical expenses, such costs were within the broad 
second prong of the statutory definition. In 1990, Congress addressed this problem by 
amending section 213 to specifically exclude “cosmetic surgery or other similar 
procedures” from the definition of medical expenses.109
Medicine and drugs also affect the structure or function of the body, so medicine 
and drug costs seem to be within the definition of medical expenses. Congress, however, 
specifically provided in section 213 that medicine and drug costs are medical expenses 
only if the drugs are prescription drugs.110
The Treasury Department has also excluded from the definition of medical 
expenses any expenses incurred for the general well-being of the taxpayer.111 Treasury 
Regulation section 1.213 provides that the medical expense deduction is for, “expenses 
incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or 
illness. . . .  [A]n expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health of an 
individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation, is not [deductible].”112 For example, the 
cost of a gym membership is not a medical expense, despite the fact that exercise will 
improve the taxpayer’s health.113 On the other hand, the cost of a weight loss program for 
106
 For example, Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a) states that: “the cost of medical care 
includes the cost of attending a special school for a mentally or physically handicapped individual , if 
his condition is such that the resources of the institution for alleviating such mental or physical 
handicap are a principal reason for his presence there. . . . Thus, the cost of medical care includes the 
cost of attending a special school designed to compensate for or overcome a physical handicap. . . .” 
(emphasis added)
107
 Law professors who teach the basic income tax class like to give other extreme reductio ad 
absurdum examples of the overinclusiveness of the second prong of the medical expenses definition. 
One such example is the cost of a spa day, complete with a manicure, pedicure, and haircut, each of 
which affects the “structure” of the body but seems to be a clear consumption expense. 
108
 Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81 (1976).  See also G.C.M. 36515 (1975).
109
 I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2000).
110
 I.R.C. § 213(b) (2000).
111
 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii).
112 Id.
113
 Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (1979).
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an obese taxpayer is a medical expense because obesity is recognized by doctors as a 
disease or condition.114
Much of the case law under section 213 involves taxpayers trying to deduct as a 
medical expense the cost of an item, such as a pool or a vacation, that is usually 
purchased for non-medical personal reasons.115  The idea is that taxpayers should not be 
able to convert a nondeductible personal consumption expense into a deductible medical 
expense by arguing that their medical condition required them to buy the recreational 
personal items. In distinguishing between nondeductible personal expenses and 
deductible medical expenses, courts look for a “direct and proximate relation” between 
the expense and the medical care. In doing so, courts consider various factors. For 
example, in Havey v. Commissioner, the court stated:
In determining allowability, many factors must be considered. 
Consideration should be accorded the motive or purpose of the taxpayer, 
but such factor is not alone determinative. . . . [A]lso it is important to 
inquire as to the origin of the expense. Was it incurred at the direction or 
suggestion of a physician; did the treatment bear directly on the physical 
condition in question; did the treatment bear such a direct or proximate 
therapeutic relation to the body condition as to justify a reasonable belief 
the same would be efficacious; was the treatment so proximate in time to 
the onset or the recurrence of the disease or condition as to make one the 
true occasion for the other, thus eliminating expense incurred for general, 
as contrasted with some specific, physical improvement?”116
Section 213 cases and rulings also indicate that fees paid to non-medical providers 
are deductible as medical expenses only if the services provided by the person are 
necessary to treat the taxpayer’s medical condition. (This group of cases and rulings 
involves expenses incurred for items that are not “recreational” but may nonetheless be 
characterized as either personal or medical.) For example, in Gerstacker v. 
Commissioner, the court held that the taxpayers could take a section 213 deduction for 
the legal fees they paid to establish a guardianship for Mrs. Gerstacker, so that she could 
114
 Rev. Rul. 2002-19, 2002-1 C.B. 778 (2002).
115 See, e.g., Evanoff v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1394 (1982) (in which the tax court denied 
a medical expense deduction for a home pool because there was a community pool nearby).
116
 Havey v.Commissioner, 12 T.C 409 (1949). Mr. and Mrs. Havey lived in Pittsburgh. Mrs. Havey 
had heart disease. Her doctor recommended that she go to the seashore in the summer and Arizona in 
the winter. The court held that the taxpayer could not deduct the cost of vacations in New Jersey and 
Arizona, despite the doctor’s recommendation. The court noted that: Mr. and Mrs. Havey had 
vacationed in New Jersey and Arizona before Mrs. Havey was diagnosed with heart disease; the 
Haveys took the first of the three vacations long after Mrs. Havey’s heart disease was diagnosed; the 
Haveys traveled to Arizona during late November and December, instead of during the coldest part 
of the winter; and Mrs. Havey did not seek out the services of any medical professionals on the trips. 
Although the court noted that the vacations probably improved Mrs. Havey’s health, the court 
concluded that the medical benefit of the vacations was incidental, so the taxpayers could not deduct 
the cost of the vacations as medical expenses. 
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be committed to a mental institution and receive the medical care she needed.117 On the 
other hand, the court, in Levine v. Commissioner, denied the taxpayers a medical expense 
deduction for fees they paid to a lawyer to help their mentally ill son with activities such 
as filling prescriptions, paying bills, buying clothes, hiring a housekeeper, and finding a 
job. 118
Where the taxpayers’ expenses are for treatment that is medical in nature 
(including fees for doctors’ services, hospital charges, fees for diagnostic tests, surgical 
fees, or prescription drugs), it is very difficult for the IRS to argue that the expenses are 
not medical expenses.  The assumption is that most medical treatment originates out of 
medical necessity, not pure personal consumption motives.119  The problem with this 
assumption is that the “structure” part of the “structure or function” prong of the medical 
expense definition is overinclusive; it characterizes medical services that are undertaken 
for non-medical reasons as medical expenses. This is what prompted Congress to amend 
section 213 in 1990 to provide specifically that the costs of cosmetic surgery are not 
section 213 medical expenses.120
It is interesting to note the specific language Congress used in the 1990 cosmetic 
surgery amendment. Section 213(d)(9) provides that: “The term ‘medical care’ does not 
include cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure is 
necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital 
abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring 
disease.”121 Cosmetic surgery is defined as “any procedure which is directed at improving 
the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the 
body.”122 This means that Congress in 1990 narrowed the second part of the medical 
expense definition by limiting it in a way that is consistent with the broader interpretation 
of the first prong of the definition. 
Said another way, the real baseline for characterization of medical expenses is 
whether the expense helps the patient resume or approximate normal biological 
functioning. This baseline of normal biological functioning is implicit in section 213.  
For example, the section 213 regulations provide:  “[T]he cost of medical care includes 
the cost of attending a special school designed to compensate for or overcome a physical 
handicap, in order to qualify the individual for future normal education or for normal
living, such as a school for the teaching of braille or lip reading.”123
117
 In Gerstacker v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969), rev’g 49 T.C. 522 (1968). In 
Rev. Rul. 71-281, 1971-2 C.B. 165 (1971), the IRS ruled that it would follow the appellate court 
decision in Gerstacker. 
118
 695 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir., 1982), aff’g 42 T.C.M. 763 (1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
119
 Professor Kelman has challenged this assumption, pointing out the income elasticity and price 
elasticity of medical care.  Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly 
in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV.
831, 866-68 (1979).
120
 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11342(a), 104 Stat. 1388-
471 (1990).
121
 I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2000).
122 Id. The IRS ruled in 1996 that the cost of laser vision correction surgery is a medical expense, 
despite the fact that it improves the taxpayer’s appearance, because it promotes the proper function of 
the taxpayer’s eyes.  Private Letter Ruling 9625049, 1996 PRL LEXIS 518 (1996).
123
 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a) (emphasis added).
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The section 213 regulations, revenue rulings, and case law also indicate that the 
cost of a substitute for the taxpayer’s diseased or impaired body part is a medical 
expense. In Rev. Rul. 68-452,124 the taxpayer received a kidney transplant and paid the 
travel, surgical, and hospital expenses of the kidney donor.  The IRS ruled that the 
taxpayer could deduct the expenses attributable to the donor but paid by the taxpayer, 
under section 213.125  The costs of the kidney donor were medical expenses of the 
taxpayer-patient under either prong of the medical expense definition: the transplant was 
a “treatment” for the taxpayer-patient’s kidney disease and was for the purpose of 
affecting the structure or function of the taxpayer-patient’s body – even though some of 
the medical care was given to another person, the donor.
The cost of a substitute for the taxpayer’s diseased or impaired body part can 
qualify as a medical expense under the first prong of the definition, even though it would 
not qualify under the second prong. This is particularly true of the costs of care that 
“mitigates” or “ameliorates” the taxpayer’s disease, condition or impairment. For 
example, the section 213 regulations specifically provide that taxpayers can take a 
medical expense deduction for the cost of a seeing eye dog.126 In Rev. Rul. 64-163,127 the 
IRS ruled that the taxpayers could deduct the amounts they paid to a person who served 
as a blind student’s guide at school.  The tax court has held that taxpayers could deduct 
the amounts they paid to a person who took class notes for their deaf child.128 These 
various costs for substitutes for normal functioning do not affect the structure or function 
of the taxpayer’s body, but qualify as medical expenses because the items in question 
mitigate a disease, condition, or impairment under the first prong of the definition. Note 
that in all of these examples, the payments are being made to non-medical providers, but 
the expenses are incurred for care. These examples are thus distinguishable from cases 
such as Gerstacker, because, in those cases, the payments that were made to non-medical 
providers were not for the care of the patient; instead, the expenses were for services that 
were ancillary to the care of the patient. 
Next, we will consider how these rules and principles are applied to characterize 
the costs of fertility treatment.
2. Application to fertility treatment expenses.
a. Application to fertility treatment expenses in general.
First, consider the characterization of the costs of fertility treatment that does not 
involve a donor or surrogate. The costs are medical expenses under either prong of the 
section 213 definition. The purpose of non-third-party fertility treatment is to help the 
woman patient become pregnant and give birth to a child, so the treatment costs are 
incurred “for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the [taxpayer’s] 
124
 Rev. Rul. 68-452, 1968-2 C.B. 111 (1968). 
125 Id.
126
 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1). It is irrelevant whether the blindness was caused by disease or injury, 
or was congenital.  Id.
127
 Rev. Rul. 64-163, 1964-1 C.B. 121 (1964).
128
 Baer Est. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 170, 173 (1967).
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body”129 Fertility treatment costs also qualify as medical expenses under the first prong 
of the section 213(d) definition: infertility is recognized by the medical profession as a 
disease or condition,130 and fertility treatment costs are incurred for the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, or treatment of that disease or condition. The costs of the initial physician and 
laboratory workup are incurred to diagnosis the specific cause of the infertility. Some 
infertility treatment, such as surgical repair of blocked fallopian tubes, endometriosis, or 
varicocele, “cures” or “treats” the disease or condition of infertility.  Some conventional 
treatments and assisted reproductive technologies do not “cure” the disease or condition 
of infertility, but “mitigate” it. 
In spite of the fact that fertility treatment expenses seem to fit the medical expense 
definition, the IRS could argue that the fertility treatment expenses are nonetheless not 
deductible under section 213, because the decision to bear children is a nondeductible 
personal consumption decision instead of a medical decision. 
The tax law, for purposes of defining the scope of the business expense 
deduction,131 has consistently treated child-rearing as a form of personal consumption.  
Since 1940, when Smith v. Commissioner was decided, the tax law has treated child care 
expenses as nondeductible personal consumption expenses, not as deductible business 
expenses.132 In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Smith had to pay for child care so that they could 
both work.  They argued that their child care costs should be deductible as business 
expenses.  The court disallowed the business expense deduction, stating, “[w]e are not 
prepared to say that the care of children, like similar aspects of family and household life, 
is other than a personal concern.”133
How could the IRS make this consumption argument in the context of the medical 
expense deduction? First, the IRS could argue that fertility treatment is within the 
cosmetic surgery exception of section 213(d)(9) because fertility treatment is a lifestyle 
choice and is thus “similar” to cosmetic surgery. Recall that section 213 (d)(9)(A) 
provides that “the term ‘medical care’ does not include cosmetic surgery or other similar 
procedures unless the surgery or procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising 
from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an 
accident or trauma, or a disfiguring disease.”134  Section 213(d)(9)(B) defines cosmetic 
129
 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
130
 The American Society of Reproductive Medicine, a non-profit organization of scientists, doctors, 
nurses, and other health professionals, characterizes infertility as a “disease of the reproductive 
system.” ASRM Resources for Patients, Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility at 
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html#Q1 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
131
 Taxpayers deduct their ordinary and necessary business expenses under I.R.C. § 162 (2000).
132
 Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1938), aff’d per curiam, 113 F. 2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
133 Id. at 1039. Professor Douglas Kahn summarizes the tax law’s treatment of child care costs in 
this way:
While the expenses of caring for children may be a necessary cost of 
freeing the parent from the home so that he can earn income, it is also an 
expense arising out of personal, family obligations.  The cost of child care 
is analogous to commuting expenses which are not deductible even though 
a taxpayer is not able to earn gross income unless he travels from his 
residence to his place of work.
DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 434, §10.2000 (4th ed. 1999).
134
 I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2000).
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surgery as “any procedure which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and 
does not meaningfully improve the proper function of the body.”  
The scope of section 213(d)(9), however, is too narrow for this argument to 
succeed.  “Similar” in the context of section 213(d)(9) means procedures other than 
cosmetic surgery that are “directed at improving the patient’s appearance and [do] not 
meaningfully improve the proper function of the body,”135 such as lyposuction and hair 
transplants. The legislative history of this amendment to section 213 specifically states:
[U]nder the provision, procedures such as hair removal, electrolysis, hair 
transplants, lyposuction, and face lift operations generally are not 
deductible. In contrast, expenses for procedures that are medically 
necessary to promote the proper function of the body and only incidentally 
affect the patient's appearance or expenses for treatment of a disfiguring 
condition arising from a congenital abnormality, personal injury or 
trauma, or disease (such as reconstructive surgery following removal of a 
malignancy) continue to be deductible under present-law rules.136
Note that the cosmetic surgery amendment was drafted to create an exception for 
the cost of medical procedures that affect the structure and appearance of the body, but 
not the function of the body. In other words, the cosmetic surgery amendment was 
supposed to limit the “structure or function” prong of the medical expense definition, not 
the first prong of the definition. (Said another way, the amendment limited the 
overbreadth of the second prong.) The cost of breast augmentation cannot qualify as 
medical expenses because the cost: (1) is not incurred because of disease or a medical 
condition, so is not within the first prong of the definition; and (2) does not affect the
functioning of the body, so is not within the second prong of the definition. 
On the other hand, the costs of cosmetic surgery procedures that either affect the 
functioning of the body or mitigate the affects of a disease or medical condition are 
deductible medical expenses. Fertility treatment expenses, other than the costs of 
surrogacy, could be characterized as medical expenses under the “structure or function” 
prong of the definition, but all fertility treatment expenses can also be characterized as 
medical expenses under the first prong of the definition because fertility treatment costs 
are incurred for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or treatment of the disease or medical 
condition of infertility.137
Second, and more generally, the IRS could argue that giving birth to a child is 
“merely beneficial to the general health of the [taxpayer],” and that fertility treatment 
135 Id.
136
 H.R. Rep. No. 101-37 (1990).
137
 The IRS might argue that fertility treatment is analogous to cosmetic surgery because fertility 
treatment is not a life or death matter for the infertile patient.  On the other hand, cosmetic 
surgery is the only type of medical expense specifically addressed in § 213.  Since Congress 
specifically excluded cosmetic surgery from the definition of medical care when it amended § 
213 in 1990, the Congressional failure to exclude fertility treatment from the definition of 
medical care may have been deliberate. As the old maxim of statutory construction goes, 
expressio unius, exclusio alterius.  See, e.g., GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH
40 (5th ed. 1997), citing Becker v. United States, 451 U.S. 1036 (1981).
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expenses are therefore not deductible as medical expenses.138  This argument is consistent 
with one of the views expressed in the exchange of e-mails on the tax professor list 
service: the idea was that a person can lead a “normal” life without ever having children, 
so the choice of whether to bear children is a consumption decision, not a medical 
decision.  Note that, if this argument were persuasive, it would apply with equal force to 
other medical expenses that relate to reproductive choice, such as the costs of 
contraceptives, abortions, vasectomies, and sterilization procedures. The argument could 
also apply to medical expenses that relate to sexual conditions or dysfunction, such as the 
cost of Viagra, because a person can also lead a “normal” life without being sexually 
active.
Insurance companies have taken inconsistent positions regarding coverage of 
treatments that relate to reproductive choice. The majority of insurance plans cover 
abortion, vasectomy, and tubal ligation;139 Fewer plans cover contraceptives and very few 
plans cover fertility treatment such as IVF.140 Some insurance companies have taken the 
position that the decision to bear or not bear children is a “lifestyle choice” and have 
declined to cover fertility treatment and contraceptives for that reason.141 Insurance 
companies and employers who purchase insurance for their employees take into account 
the cost of treatments when they determine the coverage of plans.  Given their need to 
ration care, it is not surprising that many insurance companies have not wanted to cover 
expensive treatments like IVF and widely used, low-cost treatments such as 
contraceptives. On the other hand, insurers have covered the costs of Viagra.142
According to an insurance industry spokesperson explaining the differing treatment of 
Viagra and contraceptives: “There is a clear distinction between Viagra, . . . approved as 
a cure for a medical dysfunction, and contraception, . . . a 'lifestyle drug.'"143
During an e-mail discussion of this tax issue on the tax law professor list service, 
a prominent tax professor similarly took the position that fertility treatment costs are not 
deductible as medical expenses because fertility treatment constitutes a lifestyle choice, 
not medical treatment.144 The professor also expressed the view that the cost of Viagra 
could be deductible as a medical expense when used to treat sexual dysfunction.145
138
 Treasury Regulation § 1.213 provides that “an expenditure which is merely beneficial to the 
general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation, is not [deductible].” Treas. 
Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii).
139
 Bob Rosenblatt, Viagra Spurs New Questions About HMO Drug Coverage, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 
1998, at S8. 
140 Id.
141
 Marie McCullough, Infertile Couples Have New Ammo in Pushing for Insurance Coverage, THE 
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, July 9, 2000, at KR-K7973. 
142
 Paul Rauber, It's a Man's World, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 20. 
143
 Statement of Richard Coorsh, a spokesperson for the Health Insurance Association of America. 
Debra Baker, Viagra Spawns Birth Control Issue, 84 A.B.A. J. 36, 136 (1998).
144
 The professor said, “I suppose reproduction is a bodily function, but it is one the exercise of 
which is purely optional -- a lifestyle choice.” E-mail submission from Professor Joseph Dodge, 
Florida State University College of Law, to Taxprof, a closed Internet discussion group for tax law 
professors at AALS-accredited law schools (Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with author).
145 Id. Professor Dodge took the position that expenditures incurred to “repair” a physical defect 
are deductible, but expenditures incurred to “improve” physical performance beyond a baseline of 
normal functioning are not deductible. He posited that expenditures for treatment that merely 
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The argument is that the cost of medical care that furthers reproductive choice is
not deductible under section 213 where the medical care does not repair or treat a disease 
or a condition. Applying this approach, the cost of contraceptives, vasectomies, and tubal 
ligations would not be deductible. On the other hand, Viagra and IVF both ameliorate a 
disease or condition; the costs of fertility treatment to treat reproductive dysfunction may
be deductible if the costs of Viagra to treat sexual dysfunction are deductible. (Viagra and 
IVF both simulate normal functioning by temporarily bypassing but not curing the 
underlying medical problem.146)
Consider whether the IRS could successfully argue the line of cases in which 
taxpayers have tried to convert nondeductible personal consumption expenses into 
deductible medical expenses. The types of expenses involved in these cases, such as the cost 
of a pool, vacation, golf, gym membership, or trip to a spa, are typically incurred for a 
consumption motive by people who are healthy. Although the item in question may provide 
incidental health benefits, the cost of the item is not a medical expense. In some cases, 
however, the taxpayer can argue that the recreational expenses were incurred primarily for 
medical reasons. 
In many cases in which the taxpayer tries to deduct recreational expenses as 
medical expenses, the taxpayer fails to establish the factors required to support a medical 
expense deduction. In contrast, a court applying the factors from these cases to fertility 
treatment expenses would conclude that: (1) the taxpayers’ motive is to diagnose, treat, or 
ameliorate the medical disease or condition of infertility; (2) the fertility treatment is 
undertaken at the direction or suggestion of a physician; (3) the diagnosis, treatment, or 
amelioration bears a direct relationship to the infertility and justifies a reasonable belief 
that the care will be efficacious; and (4) the care is proximate in time to the onset or 
recurrence of the infertility.147
Said another way, pools, vacations, and golf are typically purchased primarily for 
fun, and only incidentally for health benefits, by healthy individuals; IVF, egg donor, and 
surrogacy procedures, on the other hand, are not undertaken by healthy individuals for 
fun. (In this respect, fertility treatment presents a clearer case for deduction that does 
Viagra, because many men who do not suffer from erectile dysfunction are using Viagra 
“recreationally.”148)  If a doctor told an infertile patient to take a vacation in Hawaii to 
counteracts the effects of aging are not deductible, but noted that erectile dysfunction is, in some 
cases, not age-related. Id.
146
 Erectile dysfunction has a variety of causes including diabetes, prostate disorders, side effects of 
medications, and psychological disorders.  Viagra does not cure these disorders. It creates a 
temporary erection by blocking a specific enzyme in the penis. John Simons, Taking on Viagra, 
FORTUNE, June 9, 2003, at 110. 
147
 Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C 409 (1949). 
148 Christine Gorman, Viagra Turns 5; Early Safety Concerns Proved Baseless, and Now 
the Competition Is Heating Up, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 2003, at 146.  
One trend that has started to worry public-health officials, however, is the growing 
recreational use of Viagra in some settings. Gay men seem to be at the vanguard of 
this trend. Viagra, often in combination with illegal drugs like ecstasy, enables 
patrons of sex clubs to have sex with more partners, which increases their risk of 
contracting sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) like syphilis and aids. "One out of 
three sexually active gay men at our STD clinics has used Viagra in the past year," 
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improve his or her chances of conceiving, the costs of such a vacation could be 
characterized as personal and nondeductible under this line of cases, but the costs of 
medical procedures to ameliorate infertility cannot be characterized as personal and 
nondeductible under this line of cases.149
The IRS has taken seemingly inconsistent positions on the characterization of the 
costs of reproductive medical care as deductible medical expenses. The section 213 
regulations specifically provide that “amounts paid for operations or treatments affecting 
any portion of the body, including obstetrical expenses. . . . , are deemed to be for the 
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. . . .”150 In other words, medical 
obstetrical care of a woman who is already pregnant is medical care.
Over the years, the IRS has changed its position on the deductibility of costs of 
medical care that permits reproductive choice.  In 1957, the IRS ruled that the taxpayers 
could not deduct the cost of an artificial insemination as a medical expense, since the 
expense was “not incurred primarily for prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental 
defect or illness.”151  In other words, the IRS, in 1957, did not regard infertility as a 
defect or illness. The medical profession today recognizes infertility as a disease or 
medical condition, so the reasoning of the 1957 ruling may lead to a different conclusion 
today.
The IRS also issued a series of revenue rulings in the early 1970s, following the
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade.152  In these rulings, the IRS ruled that the costs 
of contraceptives, abortions, vasectomies, and sterilizations all qualify as section 213 
medical expenses.153
In addition, the IRS recently revised the taxpayer publication on medical expenses 
to include “fertility enhancement” on the list of items that are deductible as medical 
expenses.154 The publication states that section 213 medical expenses include “the cost of 
says Dr. Jeffrey Klausner, director of STD Prevention and Control Services in San 
Francisco. The same was true for 1 of 14 heterosexual men at the clinics.
Id.
149
 During an e-mail exchange on the Taxprof list serve, Professor Joe Dodge argued: “I suppose 
reproduction is a bodily function but it one the exercise of which is purely optional – a lifestyle 
choice. Sexual activity is also a bodily function, but nobody would seriously claim that sexual 
devices, toys, and fees for sexual services should be deductible.” E-mail submission from Professor 
Joseph Dodge, Florida State University College of Law, to Taxprof, a closed Internet discussion 
group for tax law professors at AALS-accredited law schools (Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with 
author). Expenditures for sexual devices, toys, and sexual services are not deductible because such 
items are the analogue of the trip to Hawaii, meaning that such items are typically purchased by 
healthy individuals for fun, not for medical reasons. These expenditures are thus distinguishable from 
expenditures for medical fertility treatment under the § 213 cases. 
150
 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii). The language in the regulation was promulgated before fertility 
treatment was common, so the term “obstetrical expenses” does not necessarily include fertility 
treatment expenses. Treasury Regulation § 1.231-1 was promulgated by the Treasury Department on 
December 14, 1957, T.D. 6279, 22 F.R. 10052.
151
 Private Letter Ruling 5707244900A (1957 PLR LEXIS 736).
152
 410 U.S. 113 (1973.)
153 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (1973) (cost of birth control pills is a medical 
expense under § 213).
154 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, IRS PUBLICATION 502, MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 
(FOR USE IN PREPARING 2003 RETURNS).
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. . . procedures to overcome your inability to have children,” specifically including 
IVF.155
For purposes of characterizing costs as deductible medical expenses, the 
appropriate baseline in section 213 is a baseline of normal biological functioning.156 The 
section 213(d)(1)(A)  definition must be read in light of the benchmark of normal 
biological functioning.  Recall that the costs of cosmetic surgery were thought to qualify 
as medical expenses, prior to the amendment, under the “structure or function” prong of 
the definition. For purposes of the Federal Trade Commission definition of a “drug” 
(from which the section 213 definition of medical care was borrowed),157 a substance that 
affects the structure of the body should be treated as a drug – even if it does not affect the 
functioning of the body.  For purposes of section 213, however, medical care that affects 
a structure of the body should only be treated as medical care if it helps to restore or 
approximate normal biological functioning.  For example, the cost of a prosthetic leg 
affects the structure of the body and affects the function of the body. 
Cosmetic surgery does affect the “structure” of the body, but is not medical care 
for purposes of section 213 because it does not affect normal biological functioning.  The 
change in the structure of the body just affects appearance.  In terms of normal biological 
functioning, large breasts and small breasts have the same function and large noses and 
small noses have the same function.  
On the other hand, if cosmetic surgery is necessary to restore or approximate 
normal functioning, it is medical care.  Medically necessary cosmetic surgery includes 
surgery to repair congenital abnormalities, injuries, and disfigurements from disease. 
Consistent with this language, a breast augmentation procedure is not medical care, for 
purposes of section 213, but a breast reconstruction surgery following surgical removal of 
breast cancer is medical care.  The standard is not whether the patient would die or would 
appear in public to be disabled without treatment; the standard is whether the treatment is 
necessary to restore or approximate normal biological functioning.158
Reproduction is part of normal biological functioning. Opinions in disability law 
and constitutional law cases can be cited for the proposition that reproduction is not only 
155 Id. at 6. The publication also states that “[s]urgery, including an operation to reverse prior surgery 
that prevents you from having children” is medical care for purposes of  § 213.
156
 For example, recall that Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a) provides:  “[T]he cost of 
medical care includes the cost of attending a special school designed to compensate for or 
overcome a physical handicap, in order to qualify the individual for future normal education or 
for normal living, such as a school for the teaching of braille or lip reading.” (emphasis added)
157 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 2 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS, ¶ 36.1.2, text at n.9 (2000), citing 15 U.S.C. § 55(c) (LEXIS through P.L. 108-30, 
approved May 29, 2003).
158
 Recall that expenses for care that affects a structure of the body are within the § 213 definition of 
medical care – even if the care does not affect the functioning of the body.  Medical care, for 
purposes of § 213, should not include care that affects the structure of the body but not functioning.  
Breast reconstruction surgery affects the structure of the body, but it also helps to repair a 
disfigurement that is caused by disease.  It also helps the patient restore some of the bodily integrity 
lost in the cancer surgery and may permit the patient to resume normal sexual functioning.  Regular 
cosmetic surgeries do not affect the functioning of the body. The cosmetic surgery amendment 
addresses one aspect of the overbreadth in the “structure and function” prong of the definition by 
specifically excluding cosmetic surgery from the definition of medical care.
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a normal function, but is a major or fundamental life activity.  For example, the Supreme 
Court held, in Bragdon v. Abbott, that reproduction is a “major life activity” for purposes 
of applying the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).159 A person is disabled 
under the ADA if he or she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more [of his or her] major life activities."160  The ADA does not define the 
operative terms in this definition, so courts have had to interpret the terms.161
Courts have interpreted the term “major life activity” under the ADA by 
comparing the activity in question to an illustrative list of “major life activities” in a 
Rehabilitation Act regulation.162  The list includes activities "such as caring for one's self, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working."163  Some courts have defined “major life activity” narrowly to require a 
showing that the activity in question meet three requirements: (1) microfrequency; (2) 
macrofrequency; and (3) universality.164 Other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 
159
 524 U.S. 624 (1998).  The respondent in the case, who was HIV positive, needed a cavity filled 
by the petitioner dentist.  After disclosing her HIV status, the dentist informed her that he would fill 
the cavity only in the hospital, for which the respondent would have to an extra hospital fee.  The 
respondent sued the dentist, alleging a violation of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination "on the 
basis of disability in the ... enjoyment of the ... services ... of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who ... operates [such] a place," 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the respondent and the First Circuit affirmed the decision.  912 F. Supp. 580 
(Me. 1995); 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case so that 
the Court of Appeals could consider whether an exception to the ADA applied in the case. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the respondent’s HIV infection was a 
"disability" for purposes of §12102(2)(A) of the ADA, which defines a disability as "a physical ... 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of [an individual's] major life activities."
160
 42 U.S.C. 12102(2).   A similar definition is used in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing 
Act. 42 U.S.C. 12102(2) (defining the term “handicapped individual” for purposes of the 
Rehabilitation Act); 29 U.S.C. 706(8)(B) (defining the term “handicap” for purposes of the Fair 
Housing Act).
161 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare define "physical or mental impairment" as "any physiological disorder or condition... 
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological[;] musculoskeletal; special 
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive[;] digestive[;] 
genito- urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997). Courts 
have defined the term “physical or mental impairment” for purposes of the ADA by looking to 
the definition of that term in other regulations, including the HEW regulation. For further 
discussion of this part of the ADA test for disabilty, see Sarah Lynn Oquist, 
Casenote: Reproduction Constitutes a "Major Life Activity" under the ADA: Implications of the 
Supreme Court's Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1382 (1999).
162 See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (ADA must be construed in a manner that is consistent with 
Rehabilitation Act regulations).
163
 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31(b)(2) (1997).
164 See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D. Iowa 1995) 
(concluding that reproduction is not a "major life activity" because it is an activity engaged in 
only infrequently); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) 
(concluding that reproduction is not a "major life activity" because it is not an activity one 
engages in "throughout the day, every day").   
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have interpreted the term “major life activity” more broadly to include any activity of 
“comparative importance.”165
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott states, “reproduction falls well 
within the phrase ‘major life activity.’ Reproduction and the sexual dynamics 
surrounding it are central to the life process itself”.166  The petitioner argued that, for 
purposes of the ADA, “major life activity” means activities that have a “public, 
economic, or daily character.”167 The Court disagreed, on the theory that “reproduction 
could not be regarded as any less important than working and learning,” which are listed 
as major life activities in the Rehabilitation Act.168
Microfrequency characterizes an activity in which an individual engages in 
numerous times throughout a day or continuously for a substantial portion of the 
day. Macrofrequency characterizes an activity in which an individual engages in 
almost every day, if not every day.  Universality characterizes an activity in which 
almost all individuals engage in, unless an individual has a "disability."  The ADA's 
list of major life activities includes "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."  All 
individuals - unless disabled - participate in the listed major life activities 
throughout the day, every day.
Oquist, supra note 161, at 1413, and cases cited in notes 537-540.
Courts have interpreted the “substantial limitation” requirement, to mean: “(i) unable to 
perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) 
significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can 
perform a particular major life activity as compared to... the average person in the general 
population [performing that major life activity].”  This definition is derived from EEOC 
regulations which provide that the term "substantially limits" means: "(i) unable to perform a 
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) 
significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can 
perform a particular major life activity as compared to... the average person in the general 
population" with regard to the same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(i), (ii).
165 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638: “As the Court of Appeals held, ‘the plain meaning of the word “major” 
denotes comparative importance’ and ‘suggests that the touchstone for determining an activitiy’s 
inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance.” Id.  Some commentators have criticized the 
broader definition of “major life activity.”  See, e.g., Oquist, supra note 161, at 1412-15 (arguing for 
the narrower three-part test).
166 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
167 Id.
168
 Justice Kennedy noted:
[T]he ADA must be construed to be consistent with regulations issued to 
implement the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). Rather than 
enunciating a general principle for determining what is and is not a major life 
activity, the Rehabilitation Act regulations instead provide a representative list, 
defining term to include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working." 45 CFR §  84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR §  41.31(b)(2) (1997). As the 
use of the term "such as" confirms, the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
These regulations are contrary to petitioner's attempt to limit the meaning of the 
term "major" to public activities. The inclusion of activities such as caring for one's 
self and performing manual tasks belies the suggestion that a task must have a 
public or economic character in order to be a major life activity for purposes of the 
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Constitutional cases have also treated reproduction as profoundly important. For 
an example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex re. Williamson,169 the Supreme Court struck 
down a forced sterilization statute.  Justice Douglas noted:  “We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.  Marriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”170
Reproductive medical care sometimes facilitates pregnancy, by treating or 
bypassing a diseased or impaired reproductive system, allowing an infertile patient to 
achieve the “normal” state of pregnancy that fertile patients can achieve without any 
medical intervention. On the other hand, reproductive medical care sometimes prevents 
or ends pregnancy. In the context of reproductive functioning, “normal” reproductive 
functioning does not always mean “natural” reproductive functioning; in this context, 
normal means a state of the body (pregnant or not pregnant) that the patient can choose 
and achieve with medical assistance.  Said another way, the section 213 definition of 
“medical care” includes medical intervention that facilitates reproductive choice. 
Since the early 1970s, the IRS has consistently taken the position that the costs of 
medical treatment to prevent pregnancy are deductible under section 213. Similarly, the 
costs of medical treatment to facilitate pregnancy are also deductible. In fact, the 
argument for deductibility of fertility expenses is arguably stronger; unlike medical 
means of birth control, fertility treatment diagnoses, treats, or mitigates a disease or 
condition. In other words, fertility treatment is more like the example of Viagra being 
used to treat sexual dysfunction. It is irrelevant that some people who choose not to have 
ADA.  On the contrary, the Rehabilitation Act regulations support the inclusion of 
reproduction as a major life activity, since reproduction could not be regarded as 
any less important than working and learning.
524 U.S. at 639.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment but dissenting in part (joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas), took the position that reproduction may not be “major,” for purposes of the 
ADA “major life activity” test.  In his view, “major” may mean “greater in quantity, number, or 
extent,” instead of  “comparative importance,” as the majority assumed:
No one can deny that reproductive decisions are important in a person's life. But 
so are decisions as to who to marry, where to live, and how to earn one's living. 
Fundamental importance of this sort is not the common thread linking the 
statute's listed activities. The common thread is rather that the activities are 
repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally 
functioning individual. They are thus quite different from the series of activities 
leading to the birth of a child.
524 U.S. at 660.
Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment but dissenting in part, concluded that 
reproduction is not a “major life activity,” for purposes of the ADA because it is not an activity in 
which all persons engage:
In my view, the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of the lives 
of many women, is not generally the same as the representative major life activities 
of all persons -- "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working" -- listed in regulations relevant 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
524 U.S. at 670.
169
 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
170 Id. at 541. 
7/13/2004, 2:18 PM
31
children (or who choose not to be sexually active) can lead happy, normal lives. A person 
who wants to have children (or to be sexually active) and cannot because of a biological 
limitation is not leading a normal life. A person’s body should permit the person to 
choose whether to bear children: what a person does with that choice is irrelevant. If a 
person’s body does not permit the person to choose whether to bear children and that 
person seeks medical care to overcome the disease or condition, the cost of that medical 
care is deductible under section 213.
With a section 213 benchmark of normal functioning, the IRS might try to 
distinguish between fertility treatment costs of pre-menopausal women and post-
menopausal women.171  If a younger woman cannot have children without an IVF 
procedure because her fallopian tubes are blocked, the IVF procedure enables the woman 
to approximate normal functioning.  If a 50-year old woman cannot have children without 
an IVF procedure (and perhaps an egg donor) because of her age, the IRS may argue that 
fertility treatment enables the woman to approximate supernormal functioning.   On the 
other hand, the activity, child bearing, is part of normal functioning.  
Normal reproductive functioning incorporates reproductive choice.172
Childbearing by a postmenopausal woman is not natural – meaning that it requires 
medical intervention in all cases – but that is true of all medical care that is designed to 
counter the natural effects of aging, and it is true of all forms of medical care that prevent 
or end pregnancy.  Medical treatment of other disorders related to aging, such as 
osteoporosis, heart disease, and dementia, are medical care despite the fact that these 
disorders are “natural” in older people.  In addition, hormone replacement therapy for 
post-menopausal women is treated as medical care.173 Said another way, “[i]t is certainly 
‘unnatural’ for post-menopausal women to give birth, but virtually every medical 
intervention is ‘unnatural’ to some degree.”174  The only difference between the medical 
treatment of infertility of post-menopausal women and medical treatment of other 
disorders related to aging is that the other disorders entail loss of more day-to-day 
functioning; but nothing in section 213 makes deductibility turn on such a distinction. 
b. Application to the expenses of donor and surrogacy procedures.
Fertility procedures involving donors and surrogates raise additional 
characterization issues. In a donor procedure, the issue is whether the additional costs of 
using the donor (which can include the donor’s fee, the broker’s fee, the fee for the 
donor’s attorney, the cost of insurance for the donor, and medical care of the donor) are 
characterized as medical expenses under section 213. In a surrogacy procedure, there are 
two issues: (1) are any of the costs of the procedure characterized as medical expenses 
under section 213; and (2) if so, are the additional costs of using the surrogate (which can 
include the surrogate’s fee, the surrogate’s fee, the fee for the surrogate’s attorney, the 
171
 Fertility of women declines with age, but more and more older women are having children.  
RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 11, 14.  The birthrate for 40 to 44-year-old women has 
increased 74 percent since 1981.  
172
 This argument is consistent with the position of the IRS that contraceptives, abortion, vasectomy, 
and sterilization expenses are all medical expenses.
173
 I.R.C. § 213(b) and (d)(3) (2000).
174 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 162.
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cost of insurance for the surrogate, and medical care of the surrogate) characterized as 
medical expenses?
The goal of a donor procedure is still for the woman taxpayer to conceive and 
bear a child, which changes the structure of the taxpayer’s body, and the procedure is 
undertaken to ameliorate the taxpayer’s infertility. The costs of the donor procedure, 
including the costs of care for the taxpayer and the donor and the related costs of using 
the donor, are thus medical expenses under either prong of the section 213 definition. 
The IRS has, at least for now, conceded this issue and allowed a medical expense 
deduction for the costs of an egg donor procedure.175 On the other hand, in the unusual 
case in which the taxpayer pays a super-model egg donor or super-brainy egg donor an 
exorbitant fee, the IRS could still challenge the deduction for the donor’s fee, on the 
theory that the extra amount paid to the donor for her beauty or brains is the analogue of 
cosmetic surgery.176
175
 Private Letter Ruling 200318017 (January 9, 2003) (available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts, document 
number 2003 TNT 86-12 (May 5, 2003))(egg donor expenses and related costs are medical
expenses).
176
 Patients trying to find an egg donor are typically looking for a proxy for themselves.  Most 
couples try to find an egg donor who physically resembles the intended mother or father. CHOOSING 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 238.
Most recipient couples are very grateful to be able to receive donated ova and 
they try to have few expectations or requirements of a donor.  Nonetheless, like 
parents through sperm donation, they hope that the donor will bear some physical 
(and ideally psychological) resemblance to them.  Although many will tell the 
child the truth about his or her origins, they prefer a child that "fits in," because 
similarities will make it less likely that strangers will be asking bothersome and 
intrusive questions.
As with sperm donation, concerns about the donor extend beyond 
physical appearances.  Aware of the significance of genetics, couples hope that 
the donor will resemble them in other ways as well.  Although most seek 
personality and intellectual similarities, some couples focus on ethnic or religious 
connections.  For example, one couple seeking ovum donation was so intent on 
finding a Jewish donor (regardless of physical or other characteristics) that the 
husband wrote a personal letter to every rabbi whose name was on a long list of 
Jewish clergy.  When this search proved fruitless, he went on the internet, against 
in search of a "Jewish egg."  While some would question his search and suggest 
that he was "not ready for ovum donation," there is a long history in both sperm 
donation and adoption of couples who wish to create or adopt children who share 
their ethnic history.
Id.
Ironically, one of the notorious “top dollar” egg donor advertisements that specified that the 
donor should be at least 5’10” was for a 5’11” woman and her 6’5” husband.  Kenneth R. Weiss, 
Eggs Buy a College Education, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2001, A1 at A31.  According to Darlene 
Pinkerton, the egg donor broker who placed the advertisement:  “They want a tall child. . . . People 
are not trying to create a super-athlete or super-intelligent being.  They are trying to match 
themselves.”  Id. The article goes on to state:  “It is true, brokers say, that women of Asian descent 
look for donors with similar heritage. Jewish families want Jewish donors.  Most women seek to 
match their height, hair and eye color, and most brokers encourage parents to pick donors who 
resemble them.”  Id.  Families selecting a sperm donor also typically try to find a sperm donor who 
looks like the intended father. CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 190 (1998). 
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Surrogate procedures differ from non-surrogate procedures because the goal in a 
surrogate procedure is to have the surrogate, not the woman taxpayer, get pregnant and 
bear a child. If the woman taxpayer can produce eggs, some of the medical treatment 
affects the structure or function of the woman taxpayer’s body, but the costs of 
implanting the embryo in the surrogate’s uterus and the additional costs of a surrogate are 
not incurred for the purpose of affecting the structure or function of the taxpayer’s body. 
If the woman taxpayer cannot produce eggs, either an egg donor or the surrogate is 
stimulated to produce eggs, and the resulting embryos are implanted in the surrogate’s 
uterus, so none of the treatment affects the structure or function of the woman taxpayer’s 
body.177
The fact that some or all of the surrogacy expenses do not qualify under the second 
prong of the medical expenses definition is irrelevant, however, if the expenses qualify 
under the first prong of the definition. The characterization of these expenses under the first 
prong of the section 213 definition turns on whether infertility is regarded by the medical 
profession as a disease or condition. 
Recall that the section 213 regulations, revenue rulings, and case law indicate that 
the cost of a substitute for the taxpayer’s diseased or defective body part is a medical 
expense. The section 213 regulations specifically provide that taxpayers can take a 
medical expense deduction for the cost of a seeing eye dog or artificial teeth or limbs.178
In Rev. Rul. 68-452,179 the taxpayer received a kidney transplant and paid the travel, 
surgical, and hospital expenses of the kidney donor.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer 
could deduct the expenses attributable to the donor but paid by the taxpayer, under 
section 213.  In Rev. Rul. 64-163,180 the IRS ruled that the taxpayers could deduct the 
amounts they paid to a person who served as a blind student’s guide at school.  The tax 
court has held that taxpayers could deduct the amounts they paid to a person who took 
class notes for their deaf child.181
Whether payments for a “substitute” uterus or for “substitute” eggs or sperm are 
analogous to the sanctioned substitutes again depends on whether reproduction is part of 
normal functioning.  As discussed earlier, courts would likely conclude that reproductive 
functioning is part of normal functioning.  As one author has stated about surrogacy:
[I]f one has the freedom to procreate, then by extension one should also 
have the freedom to choose how procreation will occur.  This argument 
appears to have merit when one considers that infertile couples have the 
same desires to have and to raise children of their own as do fertile 
couples.  Infertile couples should not be forced to give up their 
fundamental right to procreate when available medical technology and 
While some patients try to have a child with more desirable traits than the patient has, those cases are 
the exception, not the rule.  Kenneth R. Weiss, Eggs Buy a College Education, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 
2001, A1 at A31.
177
 Where the surrogate supplies the eggs and carries the child, the procedure is sometimes an 
artificial insemination procedure, which is less costly than an IVF procedure.
178
 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1) .
179
 Rev. Rul. 68-452, 1968-2 C.B. 111 (1968).
180
 Rev. Rul. 64-163, 1964-1 C.B. 121 (1964).
181
 Baer Est. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 170, 173 (1967).
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social agreements can allow them to enjoy the same rights as couples who 
are fertile.182
This “substitute for normal functioning” argument would support a deduction for 
the additional costs of a donor procedure,183 and would support a deduction for all of the 
costs of a surrogacy procedure.184
The IRS might try to distinguish the kidney donor ruling on the grounds that, in 
the case of a donor or surrogate procedure, some of the extra treatment costs are paid to 
non-medical parties, including the lawyer and broker for the donor or surrogate and the 
donor or surrogate herself.185  The payment to the egg donor or surrogate is payment for a 
substitute for the taxpayer’s diseased or impaired body part, so it is deductible just as the 
costs of seeing eye dogs and human guides and note-takers are deductible. In these cases, 
the payment to the non-medical provider is for care that mitigates the taxpayer’s disease 
or condition.186
These expenses are distinguishable from payments to non-medical providers that 
are not for care, but instead are for services that are ancillary to care. In the context of 
fertility treatment, the ancillary expenses paid to non-medical providers would include 
182
 Laura A. Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of 
Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, 39 CATH. LAW. 241, 252-
53 (1999) (footnotes and citations omitted).
183
 More specifically, this “substitute for normal functioning” argument would support a deduction 
for the typical additional costs from a donor procedure, but would not support the deduction of extra 
amounts expended to create a “designer baby.”  This would not be a problem in most cases, because 
parents enlisting the assistance of an egg donor are usually trying to match themselves. This raises a 
difficult issue.  A much-criticized egg donor advertisement offered $50,000 for a donor with certain 
attributes, but it turned out that the intended mother also had those attributes.  Kenneth R. Weiss, 
Eggs Buy a College Education, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2001, A1 at A31.  If the intended mother is tall, 
pretty, athletic, and scored 1400+ on the SAT, the intended parents may have to pay an unusually 
large fee to find an egg donor who “matches” the mother.  In this example, the parents are 
approximating their normal functioning.  On the other hand, one could argue that normal functioning 
produces a child, not a child with specific attributes – even if the infertile mother has those attributes.  
In addition, it would be very difficult and awkward to determine what is required as a “substitute for 
normal functioning” on a case by case basis, so a bright-line rule, in the form of a cap on the amount 
of the deductible donor fee, is probably advisable from an administrative perspective.
184
 These third party costs are analogous to the extra costs of the donor in the kidney donor ruling. 
The medical treatment in the kidney donor ruling is a lifesaving treatment, while fertility treatment is 
not lifesaving treatment, but there is nothing in § 213 that distinguishes between lifesaving treatment 
and treatment of other kinds of diseases and conditions.
185
 The intended parents may have to pay fees to the donor or surrogate, the agency that represents 
the donor or surrogate, and the lawyer who represents the donor or surrogate. These additional 
amounts are paid to non-medical personnel. The intended parents may also have to pay an insurance 
carrier for supplemental medical insurance for the donor or surrogate and a psychologist for 
evaluating the donor or surrogate. These fees are paid to medical providers, so they are less 
problematic, under § 213, than the fees paid to the non-medical providers. The issue remains, 
however, whether these fees paid to medical providers are medical expenses of the taxpayer. They 
are if they are incurred to treat or ameliorate the taxpayer’s medical infertility.
186
 In the kidney donor ruling, the recipient of the kidney did not pay the kidney donor for the 
donated kidney.
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the fees paid to the lawyer for the donor or surrogate and the fees paid to the broker or 
agency that represents the donor or surrogate. Are these additional fees medical 
expenses? 
Consider the section 213 cases and rulings that indicate that fees paid to persons 
who are not medical professionals are deductible as medical expenses only if the services 
provided by the person are necessary to treat the taxpayer’s medical condition. In 
Gerstacker v. Commissioner, the appellate court held that the taxpayers could take a 
section 213 deduction for the legal fees they paid to establish a guardianship for Mrs. 
Gerstacker, so that she could be committed to a mental institution and receive the medical 
care she needed.187 On the other hand, the court, in Levine v. Commissioner, denied the 
taxpayers a medical expense deduction for fees they paid a lawyer to help their mentally 
ill son with activities such as filling prescriptions, paying bills, buying clothes, hiring a 
housekeeper, and finding a job.188 In both cases, the court was trying to determine 
whether the fees in question were necessary for the taxpayer’s medical treatment or were 
the sort of ordinary personal living expenses that are undertaken without regard to 
medical problems. This standard would usually be satisfied with respect to the payments 
to non-medical providers in egg donor and surrogacy procedures because infertile 
patients do not usually resort to such procedures unless they offer the only way to 
overcome the patients’ medical infertility.
One potential problem with the “substitute for normal functioning argument” 
argument is that it might go too far. The logical extension of this argument might seem to 
permit adoptive parents to deduct adoption expenses where the reason for adoption is the 
medical infertility of the parents. Congress recently enacted I.R.C. section 23, which 
provides for an adoption credit for part of the expenses incurred by parents adopting a 
child.189  Intended parents whose child is carried by a surrogate, then adopted by the 
intended parents, cannot claim the section 23 credit.190 The enactment of section 23 might 
seem inconsistent with the broadest definition of medical expenses under section 213. On 
the other hand, donor and surrogacy procedures can be distinguished from adoption 
procedures for purposes of section 213. In both donor and surrogacy procedures, the 
intended parents initiate a medical procedure to bear their own child. In adoption, the 
adoptive parents do not set in motion a medical procedure to bear their own child; instead 
they initiate a non-medical process that enables them to adopt the child of another person, 
the biological parent or parents of the child. Adoption expenses are not, therefore, 
characterized as medical expenses under section 213, even if the adoption results from 
the medical infertility of the adoptive parents. 
The legislative history of section 23, which supports this interpretation, indicates 
that members of Congress may have excluded surrogacy expenses from the scope of 
section 23 precisely because they assumed that those surrogacy expenses would be 
deductible under section 213 as medical expenses:
187
 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969), rev’g 49 T.C. 522 (1968). In Revenue Ruling 71-281, 1971-2 C.B. 
165 (1971), the IRS ruled that it would follow the appellate court decision in Gerstacker.
188
 695 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir., 1982), aff’g 42 T.C.M. 763 (1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
189 I.R.C. § 23 (2000) (amended 2001).
190
 I.R.C. § 23(d) defines the term “qualified adoption expenses” as “reasonable and necessary 
adoption fees, court costs, attorney fees, and other expenses -- . . . which are not incurred in violation 
of State or Federal law or in carrying out any surrogate parenting arrangement.”
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The question of fairness is raised when we compare the treatment of 
adoption costs to those expenses related to the conception, delivery, and birth 
of a child -- or high technology medical expenses for in vitro conception, etc.  
Parents could in most cases itemize and deduct the latter costs as medical 
expenses.  No similar relief is currently available for adoptive families.191
On the other hand, the IRS challenged a taxpayer’s medical expense deduction for 
fertility treatment expenses involving a surrogate in Sedgwick v. Commissioner.192 Jeanne 
and Walter Sedgwick had gone through six years of unsuccessful fertility treatment, 
including seven surgeries, two IVF procedures, and two dangerous ectopic 
pregnancies.193 After their doctors concluded that Jeanne could not physically carry a 
child to term, the Sedgwicks arranged for a surrogate to carry their genetic child.194 The 
IRS argued that the costs of the surrogacy were not deductible medical expenses because:
[S]urrogacy is an elective procedure. Having a child through a surrogate 
mother is not a diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the 
petitioner wife. Although it may have improved the petitioner’s general 
mental health, that’s not sufficient for allowing a deduction.195
In other words, the IRS took the position that the surrogacy expenses did not 
qualify under the first prong of the medical expense definition, because infertility is not a 
disease, and did not qualify under the second prong of the definition, because the 
treatment affected the structure or function of the surrogate’s body, not the taxpayer’s 
body.
191
 Statement made by Senator Reigle, one of the sponsors of the adoption credit bill. 140 Cong. 
Rec. S6602 (daily ed. June 8, 1994) (emphasis added).
192
 Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, LEXIS, 94 PTT 13-53 (U.S. Tax Court filed June 7, 
1994). Judge Jacobs noted that the case was one of first impression. He asked Ms. Hustad, the lawyer 
from the IRS Office of District Counsel, if she had consulted the IRS National Office about whether 
to proceed in the case.  After she responded yes, Judge Jacobs said: “That’s okay.  I was praying they 
would say no.”  Judge Jacobs’ remark prompted laughter in the courtroom.  Official Transcript of 
Case at 22, Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, LEXIS, 94 PTT 13-53 (U.S. Tax Court filed 
June 7, 1994).
193 Id. at 9, 10.
194 Id. at 46, 49, 50. The facts of the case were a bit unusual because the taxpayers were able to 
establish that the surrogate was their dependent, for tax purposes, for the year in which the surrogate 
fees were incurred. A surrogate can qualify as a dependent of the infertile taxpayers only if the 
taxpayers’ home is the surrogate’s principal home during the calendar year in which dependency is 
claimed.  I.R.C. § 151(a)(9) (2000).  Given this requirement, surrogates would not usually qualify as 
dependents of the taxpayers.
195 Id. at 26. The IRS also argued that the expenses of surrogacy also cannot be characterized as 
medical expenses of the fetus, because cases have held that a fetus becomes a dependent for tax 
purposes only after it is born. Id. The surrogate involved in the Sedgwick case miscarried. Later, the 
Sedgwicks had a child with the help of another surrogate. Id.
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On the witness stand, Jeanne Sedgwick described the eight difficult years of 
medical treatment she and her husband experienced. During her testimony, Mrs. 
Sedgwick cried as she recounted the wrenching course of her medical treatment, which 
included numerous surgeries to diagnose and treat reproductive disease, two ectopic 
pregnancies that resulted from tubal disease, two unsuccessful IVF procedures, and 
counseling to treat the severe psychological distress Mrs. Sedgwick experienced.196 Mrs. 
Sedgwick then explained that her doctors had eventually given her the medical advice 
that she should use a surrogate.197 After her testimony and a conference in the judge’s 
chambers, the IRS settled the case entirely favorably to the taxpayers.198
The facts in the Sedgwick case illustrate the progression of medical treatment of 
infertility as described above in Part II.B. Infertile patients endure years of medical 
treatment precisely because their bodies are unable biologically to do something that 
healthy bodies do naturally. Said another way, the medical treatment of infertility allows 
patients to achieve or approximate normal biological functioning.
In summary, fertility treatment costs are, under current law, section 213 medical 
expenses.  The next part will consider whether fertility treatment costs should be treated 
as section 213 medical expenses.
IV. Should Fertility Treatment Costs Be Treated as Medical or Non-Medical 
Expenses?
A. The normative starting point.
Our starting point in this normative discussion is a tax code with a section 213 
medical expense deduction. It is not a world in which we have a credit for medical 
expenses; nor is it a world in which we have universal health coverage with explicit 
rationing of health care resources.  Either of these worlds might be defended on various 
normative grounds.199
We do not, however, live in these more idealized worlds.  We live in a world with 
a partial patchwork of direct medical subsidies200 and the section 213 deduction.201
196 Id. at 41, 42. 
197 Id. at 39, 41, 48, 49.
198
 There was no reported decision in the case.  There is a stipulated decision in the case.  The 
stipulated decision, Docket No. 10133-94, dated Nov. 14, 1995, is on file with the author. 
199 See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); W. John Thomas, The Oregon 
Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy, and the Fate of a Utilitarian Health Care
Program, 72 OR. L. REV. 47, 115-21 (1993) (applying a Utilitarian ethic to the Oregon Medicaid 
program after the state legislature decided to cover more poor Oregonians and explicitly ration 
medical care). 
If we repealed § 213 and adopted universal health care with explicit rationing, in order to 
provide a basic package of health care to the 42 million Americans who are uninsured, I would 
readily concede that fertility treatments would likely not be covered, along with many other types of 
other medical treatments, such as Viagra treatment for erectile dysfunction.  If we converted § 213 
into a credit with a dollar cap, I would concede that fertility patients would not receive a tax benefit 
for part of their treatment costs.
200
 These direct expenditure health care programs include Medicaid and Medicare.  Medicaid is a 
federal program that provides grants to state health care plans for the poor.  42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
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Given this normative starting point, should fertility treatment costs be characterized as 
medical expenses or non-medical expenses under section 213?
In order to resolve this normative issue, we can ask two questions.  First, should 
fertility treatment costs be deductible in order to take account taxpayers’ ability to pay?202
For an overview of Medicaid, see Thomas, supra note 199, at 79-91.  Medicare is a federal medical 
insurance program for the elderly and disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000).  
201
 In addition to the § 213 deduction, § 105(b) of the tax code permits taxpayers to exclude 
employer reimbursements from medical flexible spending accounts.  The exclusion turns on 
whether the medical expense is within the § 213 definition of medical expenses, so the discussion 
in this section refers to the § 213 deduction.  The same arguments apply to the §105(b) exclusion.
202
 This normative question dominates the theoretical literature on the medical expense deduction. 
Considering the relationship between the expense and the ideal income tax base is the traditional 
approach to tax policy questions.  Professor Gergen has labeled the traditional normative 
approach to tax policy questions an “internal coherence approach.” In the internal coherence 
approach, “arguments are first and foremost arguments of tax law, and their normative criteria -
the criteria of coherency, consistency, and clarity - are, in a sense, intrinsic to the law.” Mark P. 
Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131 (2001).
The traditional normative approach to tax policy typically incorporates the “horizontal 
equity” and “vertical equity” norms, both of which are controversial. The term "vertical equity" is 
used for the proposition that we should apply an appropriate pattern of differentiating between 
those who are unequally situated. The term "horizontal equity" is used for the proposition that 
equals should be treated alike. Paul A. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical 
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) (arguing against formulaic 
use of the horizontal and vertical equity norms).  Economic income is generally regarded as the 
measure of equality and inequality. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE
165 (1959). 
The vertical equity norm is typically applied by considering whether persons pay tax 
according to their ability to pay: Money is assumed to have declining marginal utility, so a 
progressive income tax is thought to represent the most appropriate pattern for differentiating 
between taxpayers with different amounts of income. Id. at 90-115; Louis Kaplow, Horizontal 
Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 143, 147 (1989) [hereinafter 
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity]. However, some commentators have argued that the concept of 
vertical equity has meaning only if it is infused with a specific theory of distributive justice. See, 
e.g., McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 611. 
There is disagreement about whether the horizontal equity norm should be considered an 
independent equity norm. Many tax policymakers and economists consider the horizontal equity 
norm the most widely applicable equity norm. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE, supra, at 160 ("Perhaps the 
most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in equal positions should be 
treated equally."); C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT & WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 20-21 (1994) ("One beauty of 
the horizontal equity principle is its lack of conflict with other principles .... You and I may 
disagree on how progressive we would like government to be, but we can still agree that, 
whatever the level of progressivity, two persons in equal circumstances should be treated equally 
under the law."). 
However, other commentators, including Professors Kaplow, Griffith, McDaniel and 
Repetti have argued that the horizontal equity norm should not be considered an independent 
norm because: (i) The horizontal equity norm is subsumed within the vertical equity norm 
because any appropriate pattern of differentiating between unequals must treat equals equally; (ii) 
It is difficult to determine whether two persons are situated exactly equally; and (iii) The 
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Second, would a deduction for fertility treatment costs create improper incentives for 
taxpayers?203
B. Fertility treatment costs and ability to pay.
Most of the influential writing on the medical expense deduction, including the 
work of Professors Surrey, Andrews, and Kelman, considers the relationship between the 
medical expense deduction and the ideal income tax base.204  This literature addresses the 
question of whether medical expenses in general are part of the ideal income tax base or 
not.  As such, it does not really address the specific question here, which is whether 
fertility treatment expense should be deductible.  Considering ability to pay may, 
however, help us determine what types of expenses should and should not be deductible, 
given the existence of the section 213 deduction. 
horizontal equity norm gives no guidance if the situations of two persons vary at all. See, e.g., 
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 143, 147 (1989); Louis Kaplow, A Note on 
Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be 
Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1155-59 (1993); McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 613.
203
 This normative question takes into account the consequences of allowing a medical expense 
deduction for fertility treatment costs. Although the traditional normative approach to tax policy 
questions dominates, some influential commentators, including Professors Bankman, Kaplow, and 
Griffith, and Weisbach advocate a consequentialist approach to normative questions in tax policy.  
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 149, 154-55 (2001):
Those who adopt the welfarist/efficiency approach seek to determine the effects of a 
particular tax provision or proposal on efficiency or welfare. Those who adopt an 
internal coherency approach are skeptical of the claim that we know enough about 
how the economy interacts with the tax law to make that calculation. To that extent, 
they challenge a positive assumption that underlies the welfarist/efficiency 
approach. Many are skeptical as well about the normative assumption that underlies 
the welfarist/efficiency approach: that efficiency or welfare is all that matters. 
Consider, for example, the belief that "likes should be treated alike" which serves as 
the basis for the concept of "horizontal equity." This belief seems generally 
consistent with values of internal coherency. My guess is that it and its instantiation 
in a system of horizontal equity is one of the desiderata of a tax system that is built 
on internal coherency. Thus, like treatment of likes is a value in itself. Followers of 
the efficiency/welfare approach regard "likes should be treated alike" as an empty 
tautology, and horizontal equity as of no independent value in setting tax policy.
Id. at  156.
The influential articles on the medical expense deduction written by Professors Kaplow and 
Griffith adopt a consequentialist approach. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The 
Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 
79 CAL. L. REV. 1485 (1991) [hereinafter Income Tax as Insurance]. Thomas D. Griffith, Theories 
of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 343 (1989) [hereinafter Theories of 
Personal Deductions].
204 STANLEY SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); William Andrews, Personal 
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Kelman, supra note 119.
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Professor Surrey’s influential tax expenditure model distinguished between tax 
provision that were part of the “normal tax structure” and “special preferences.”205  The 
normal tax structure is based on Haig-Simons income, but takes into account deviations 
from Haig-Simons that are thought to be part of the “generally accepted structure” of the 
tax code (such as the realization requirement, which results in the deferral of income 
from the appreciation of property).206  Special preferences, also known as tax 
expenditures, are deviations from the normal tax structure that are “designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”207  Surrey characterized the medical 
expense deduction as a tax expenditure.208  In other words, he thought that medical 
expenses were properly includable in the income tax base.
Professor Andrews, on the other hand, argued that medical expenses should be 
excluded from the tax base, for reasons intrinsic to the tax system.  Andrews 
acknowledged that amounts spent on medical care could be construed as consumption, 
but he took the position that the ideal income tax base should reflect “material well-
being,” not just consumption.209  He argued that medical expenses should be excluded 
from the income tax base because, “[a]s between two people with otherwise similar 
patterns of personal consumption and accumulation, a greater utilization of medical 
services by one is not likely to reflect greater well-being or taxable capacity, but rather 
only greater medical need.”210  He observed that “differences in health affect relative 
well-being” but concluded that it would be impractical to try to include good health in the 
tax base.211
Andrews also considered the distributional implications of the medical expense 
deduction.212 Andrews created an example with three hypothetical taxpayers to consider the 
equity issues raised by the section 213 deduction.213 Assume that taxpayer A has $120,000 
of income before paying his medical bills and $20,000 of medical expenses.  Taxpayer B 
has $100,000 of income and no current medical expenses.  Taxpayer C has $10,000 of 
income and the same medical condition as A. C cannot afford treatment.  Andrews asked 
whether A’s $20,000 of medical expenses should be excluded from the income tax base.
205 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 204, at 3.  For a critique of Surrey’s tax expenditure approach, 
see Theories of Personal Deductions, supra note 203.
206 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 204, at 4. 
207 Id. at 3.  
208 Id. at 79.  Professor Surrey observed that tax expenditures are a form of government spending.  Id.
at 99.  He noted that tax expenditures represent “upside-down” subsidies, because the value of a tax 
deduction increases as the taxpayer’s income and marginal tax rate increase.  Id. at 103.   He argued 
that we should eliminate many tax expenditures or replace them with direct expenditure provisions.  
Id. at 112-15.
209
 Andrews agreed with earlier ideal income tax base theorists that the tax code should not have 
source-based distinctions. Andrews, supra note 204, at 316-17, n. 12, 375-76.
210 Id. at 314.  Andrews argued that medical expenses are different from other expenses:  “What 
distinguishes medical expenses from other personal expenses at bottom is a sense that large 
differences in their magnitude between people in otherwise similar circumstances are apt to reflect 
differences in need rather than choices among gratifications.”  Id. at 336.
211 Id. at 335.
212 Id. at 338.
213 Id.
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Andrews considered both vertical equity and horizontal equity in answering the 
question.  He acknowledged that richer taxpayers can buy more medical care and better 
medical care, so A is better off than C. He defended the medical expense deduction, 
nonetheless, on the ground that the “horizontal equity” comparison between A and B is 
more important than the “vertical equity” comparison between A and C:
[T]he exclusion of medical services from taxable income is justified because 
it will tend to ameliorate the effects of differences in utilization of medical 
services attributable to differences in health and need for medical services. 
The amelioration of differences among people attributable to differences in 
general income level, on the other hand, is primarily a matter of rate 
structure rather than elaboration of the tax base.214
Andrews acknowledged that some medical expenditures include “a considerable 
component of voluntary personal gratification.”  On the other hand, he thought it was 
“reasonable to act upon the proposition that disease or injury is a burden, not a boon, and 
that large differences in utilization of medical services go less than all the way toward 
offsetting differences in health need.”  He thought that the medical expense deduction 
would, of course, present line-drawing difficulties, giving as an example the treatment of 
cosmetic surgery, which he admitted resembled the non-medical purchase of 
cosmetics.215
Professor Mark Kelman challenged Andrews and argued against the section 213 
deduction.216 In Kelman's view, there should be no medical expense deduction because (1) 
taxpayers’ use of their income is irrelevant, and (2) personal deductions undermine 
progressivity.  Kelman criticized Andrews’ approach to the medical expense deduction on 
various grounds.  Kelman argued that good health is no different from other psychic 
pleasures, yet Andrews singled it out for special treatment.217 If taxpayers A and B engage 
in a risky behavior, such as smoking, what happens if A quits smoking and does not get 
sick, but B keeps smoking and gets sick?  If we do not tax gains from risky behavior, but 
allow B a deduction for medical care, B is better off than A.  In addition, Kelman challenged 
Andrews’ assumption that all medical expenditures are price-inelastic and income-
inelastic.218  He argued that spending on emergency life-saving measures, like treatment of 
arterial bleeding, is consistent with Andrews’ assumption, but most medical expenditures 
are price-elastic219 and income-elastic.220
He also argued that medical expenditures often include payments for non-medical
benefits, such as a private hospital room, but section 213 does not require taxpayers to 
214 Id. at 339.
215 Id. at 337.
216
 Kelman, supra note 119.  Kelman took the position that the tax system has two goals: first, to 
allocate tax burdens in a way that reflects individual earnings capacity; and second, to tax individuals 
only on market transactions.  
217 Id. at 869.
218 Id. at 865.
219 Id. at 868.
220 Id. at 866. Kelman notes that richer taxpayers: buy more expensive, high-tech care (assuming that 
it is "better" than less expensive care); consume more discretionary medical care like psychotherapy; 
and buy more amenities, such as a private hospital room.  Id.
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segregate the payments for the non-medical expenses.221  He noted that we could address the 
problem of mixed-motive expenses by creating a system of standard medical deductions for 
various disorders, like the system used for Worker’s Compensation.222  He also considered 
other methods of dealing with mixed-motive expenses, but found them all lacking.  In 
Kelman’s view, we should not permit full deductibility of mixed-motive medical 
expenditures, even if the medical care: (1) is the “but-for” cause of the expenditure; (2) 
provides a sufficient motive for incurring the medical expense; or (3) is the dominant motive 
for incurring the medical expense.223  He also argued that trying to apportion the mixed-
motive expense and permitting the taxpayer to deduct only the medical portion of the 
expenditure is not administrable and is an unprincipled compromise between full 
deductibility and full inclusion in the base.224
The scope of section 213 under current law is consistent with Professor Andrews’ 
normative position that a medical expenditure should be excluded from the base unless it 
constitutes an extreme “borderline” expenditure such as cosmetic surgery.225  Congress 
221 Id. at 864-65.
222 Id. at 876.
223 Id. at 877.
224 Id. at 878.
225
 Why should medical expenditures be subtracted from the based when other things that also affect 
well-being are not subtracted from the base?  In part, because of the elemental importance of health 
and the catastrophic nature of the medical expenses that exceed the 7.5 percent floor.  “Health is 
basic to all human endeavor.” Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care?  The Effect 
of the Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS L.J. 7, 13 (1994).   Professor 
Gostin continues:
Health is basic to all human endeavor and, therefore, may be regarded as a foundational 
justification for government action.   Health is a necessary condition for just about all aspects of 
human endeavor. First, health is necessary for the pursuit of livelihood. Without a certain level of 
health, a person cannot train, develop skills, or employ existing qualifications and skills in 
income-producing activities. This not only impedes individuals in obtaining the basic necessities 
of life such as food, shelter and clothing, but reduces their capacity to contribute to the 
production of goods and services in society generally.
 Second, a certain level of health is a necessary condition for the exercise of fundamental 
rights and privileges. Persons with severe physical or mental disabilities, as well as acute and 
chronic diseases, may not be able to exercise their rights to liberty (e.g., travel), autonomy 
(e.g., decision-making in personal and financial affairs), or the franchise.
Third, health is of overriding importance in achieving personal satisfaction, happiness, 
and better personal relationships. Human fulfillment is much more difficult to achieve when 
human beings experience unremitting pain and suffering, when they cannot meet their basic 
self-care needs, or when they lose mental and physical functioning. Nor can people as easily 
form close relationships with family and the community when they are dependent and have 
less physical and mental capacity to interact. Indeed, health is one of the more important 
aspects of personhood. A person's self dignity, self-identification, and status in society are 
often connected with that person's vitality and ability to function.   
When illness or disease are preventable, or when pain and disability can be alleviated, the 
government's failure to act is conspicuous. Persons whose morbidity and suffering could have 
been prevented or lessened through reasonable government interventions may understandably 
claim that they count less, that their dignity is undermined by governmental inaction.
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has specifically excluded cosmetic surgery from the definition of medical care, but has 
not excluded from the definition other forms of medical treatment that include a non-
medical element (such as laser eye surgery that corrects vision and eliminates the need 
for glasses).  In the area of reproductive medical care, the IRS has specifically ruled that 
vasectomy, tubal ligation, prescription contraceptives, and abortions are medical care for 
purposes of section 213.226
Assuming that we are keeping the section 213 deduction, we could possibly 
redefine the section 213 term “medical care” to address some of Kelman’s concerns 
about the deduction.  We could think of medical care as falling on a continuum, with 
emergency, life-saving treatment on one end, and cosmetic surgery on the other end. We 
could draw the line, between the two broad categories of “voluntary” and “involuntary” 
medical care, at various places on the continuum of care.  
Instead of considering the taxpayer’s motives or trying to apportion between the 
medical and non-medical elements of the expense, we could decide that certain types of 
medical care are important enough to be regarded as involuntary, and other types of 
medical care are not important enough to be regarded as involuntary. It might seem 
incongruous to treat medical care that facilitates reproductive choice as involuntary, but 
we might place such care on the involuntary side of the line if such care is very important 
to most people.  
We could develop a section 213 test that is comparable to the “major life activity” 
part of the ADA disability test.  Recall that the broad interpretation of the term major life 
activity is an activity “of comparative importance.”  The narrow interpretation of the term 
major life activity is an activity that satisfies the three requirements of microfrequency, 
macrofrequency, and universality. If we defined medical care by reference to this latter 
test, the term medical care would not include treatment that relates to an activity unless 
the activity is engaged in all day, every day, by everyone.  
In other words, section 213 would then not cover any medical care involving 
sexual or reproductive functioning.  Medical care would not include treatment related to 
sexual dysfunction, including Viagra, or reproductive treatments including fertility 
treatment, abortion, vasectomy, or oral contraceptives.  The argument in support of this 
position is that a person can lead a perfectly “normal” life without engaging in these 
activities. The problem with defining medical care so narrowly is that sexual and 
reproductive functioning, while not engaged in all day, every day, by everyone, is 
extremely important to most people.  
Said another way, the issue under section 213 should not be whether an activity is 
one in which all people engage; the test should be whether a person’s sexual and 
reproductive systems can function normally so the person can exercise choice over those 
biological systems.  What a person decides to do with their normally functioning body is 
irrelevant. A person who wants very much to engage in sexual conduct or reproduction, 
but cannot because of a disease, condition or abnormality, can hardly be said to be 
leading a perfectly “normal” life, just because some people decide not to engage in sex or 
reproduction.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
226 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (1973) (cost of birth control pills is a medical 
expense under § 213).
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This approach to drawing the section 213 line is consistent with the broader 
definition of “major life activity” adopted by the Supreme Court in Bragdon.  The Court
concluded that reproduction was a major life activity because reproduction is “central to 
the life process itself.”227 Under this approach to section 213, medical care would 
continue to be broadly defined and would include the reproductive medical care.228
It is interesting to note that courts seem to appreciate the importance of sex and 
reproduction more than insurers do.229 In part, this is due to the fact that insurers have 
had to narrow the scope of coverage in order to contain health care costs. Traditionally, 
insurers deferred to the medical judgment of doctors and covered the medical care 
ordered by doctors,230 but expensive new high-tech treatments began driving up the cost 
of health care dramatically.231 Beginning in the 1970s, following the 1965 enactment of 
Medicare and Medicaid, our national health policy objectives shifted from a policy of 
expanding health care coverage to a policy of cost-containment.232
Private insurers have attempted to control skyrocketing health care costs by 
stating in their contracts that coverage is limited to treatment of a “disease” or “illness”233
and is limited to care that is a “medical necessity” 234 and is not “experimental” or 
“investigative.”235 Medicare and Medicaid also exclude from coverage services that are 
not “medically necessary.”236 Insurers use these definitions to support their denial of 
coverage.
Courts have had to define the terms “illness,” “disease” and “medical necessity,”
in numerous cases, including some cases involving sexual and reproductive dysfunction.
227
 524 U.S. at 638.
228
 One problem with narrowing the § 213 definition of medical care is that it is a form of rationing 
medical care.  Americans (and their representatives in Congress) do not favor explicit health care 
rationing.  Americans, and their representatives in Congress, generally recoil at the notion of explicit 
health care rationing.  In part due to that fact, Congress has not enacted a directly subsidized 
universal health care plan.  One might speculate that the scope of § 213 is as broad as it is because 
Congress and the IRS have been unable or unwilling to make the hard calls about rationing medical 
care in the tax code.  As a deduction with broad scope, the § 213 deduction resembles an insurance 
policy with liberal coverage.  The only types of medical care specifically excluded are cosmetic 
surgery and similar treatments.
229
 Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction:  Health Insurers Don’t Want You to 
Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 158-59 (1998).
230
 Mark A. Hall, Health Insurer’s Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1644-
47 (1992).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 1663.
233
 For example, the insurance contract in Egert v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. specified 
that coverage was limited to the treatment of “illness.”  900 F.2d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 1990).
234
 Courts have in some cases deferred to the insurer’s definition of medical necessity. See, e.g., 
Dowden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 126 F.3d 641, 644 (5th Cir. 1997) (court 
concluded that the insurance plan granted Blue Cross “the exclusive and conclusive authority to 
determine coverage and benefits, and to interpret provisions of the plan, including whether treatment 
is necessary”).
235 Id. at 1647.  
236
 The federal Medicare statute excludes from coverage medical services that are not “reasonable 
and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (2000). Medicaid also limits coverage to medically 
necessary treatment.. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2002).
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In Egert v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., the court held that infertility was an 
“illness” and that IVF was “medically necessary” treatment for infertility, so the patient 
was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of IVF.237 In several cases, courts have held 
that sex reassignment surgery to treat a transsexual with gender identity disorder was a 
“medical necessity.”238 Also, shortly after the FDA approved Viagra, the federal agency 
that administers the Medicaid program239 took the position that Viagra was a “medically 
necessary” treatment for erectile dysfunction and mandated that state Medicaid programs 
cover the drug.240
Private insurance companies also contain costs by specifying in their contracts 
that certain types of care are excluded from coverage.  The vast majority of plans cover 
abortion, vasectomy, and tubal ligation,241 but fewer plans cover contraceptives and very 
few plans cover fertility treatment such as IVF.242 On the other hand, many insurers 
cover the cost of Viagra.243
Insurance companies and employers, unlike doctors determining medical 
necessity, take into account the cost of treatments when they determine the coverage of 
their plans, so it is perhaps not surprising that insurance companies have increasingly 
excluded from coverage: (1) expensive, but relatively uncommon, treatments, such as 
IVF; and (2) inexpensive, but common, treatments such as contraceptives.  On the other 
hand, Viagra is also a common treatment, so why is a Viagra covered if IVF is not?
237
 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990).  In a similar case, the Iowa Supreme Court held that infertility was 
an illness, since “the natural function of the reproductive organs is to procreate.” Witcraft v. 
Sundstrand Health and Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Ia.1988). On the other 
hand, the court held, in Kinzie v. Physician’s Liability Insurance Co., that IVF was “not a medically 
necessary service because it was elective and not required to cure or preserve [plaintiff’s] health.” 
750 P.2d 1140 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987). The result in Kinzie has been criticized on the ground that 
many types of covered treatments ameliorate but do not cure illness or disease.  See, e.g., Lisa M. 
Kerr, Note, Can Money Buy Happiness? An Examination of the Coverage of Infertility Services 
Under HMO Contracts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 628-29 (1999).
238 See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
239
 The administrative agency, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration, is now 
called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
240
 49 Fed. Reg. 35,247, 35,249(K) (1984).  The National Governors Association, the American
Public Welfare Association, and the National Association of State Medicaid Directors all opposed 
the Viagra mandate on the ground that it constituted an unfunded mandate that would cost the states 
$100 million a year. David F. Chavkin, Medicaid and Viagra: Restoring Potency to an Old Program, 
11 HEALTH MATRIX 189, 208-09 (2001) [hereinafter, Chavkin, Medicaid and Viagra].  The concern 
was that covering Viagra would divert away funds badly needed for maternal and child care, H.I.V., 
and care of the disabled.  Ninety percent of Medicaid beneficiaries are women and children. Carole 
Stewart, Comment, Mandated Medicaid Coverage of Viagra: Raising the Issues of Questionable 
Priorities, the Need for a Definition of Medical Necessity and the Politics of Poverty, 44 LOY. L. 
REV. 611, 626 (1998).  Some states later covered Viagra, but other states refused to cover it.  
Chavkin, Medicaid and Viagra, at Appendix A.  According to Professor David Chavkin, “State 
claims of dire financial consequences and ‘unfunded mandates’ have proven to be grossly 
exaggerated and States have been able to comply with federal law without threatening their financial 
health.” Id. at 231.
241
 Rosenblatt, supra note 139.
242 Id.
243
 Paul Rauber, It's a Man's World, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 20.
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Some insurance companies have taken the position that Viagra is a “medical 
necessity,”244 but fertility treatment involves a “lifestyle choice,” not a “medical 
necessity.”245 Perhaps the difference in insurance coverage of Viagra and fertility 
treatments is in part due to gendered views of the importance of reproduction and sex.  
For years, women have lived with the reality that contraceptives and fertility treatment 
are not generally covered by insurance.246  Recently, coverage of both contraceptives and 
fertility treatment has been mandated in some but not all states.247  Within two months 
after Viagra was introduced, a group of men filed a class action suit against their insurer, 
which had limited the number of Viagra pills it would cover each month, claiming they 
had been denied treatment for a “vital human function."248
If we think of medical care as falling on a continuum, with emergency, life-saving 
treatment on one end, and cosmetic surgery on the other end, we can argue about where 
on the continuum fertility treatment falls, and probably reach consensus about its relative 
importance.  Probably the vast majority of people think that both sex and reproduction 
are vitally important. 
Unfortunately, this ability-to-pay approach does not provide a clear normative 
foundation for figuring out where to draw the line on the health care continuum.  
Professor Griffith has argued that the normative underpinnings of both the Andrews and 
Kelman approaches to the medical expense deduction are incoherent.249  Professor 
Weisbach has also argued that we should adopt a consequentialist approach to line-
drawing questions in the tax law.250 We will turn now to that approach to consider the 
normative question at hand.
C. The incentive effects of allowing a deduction for fertility treatment 
costs.
Adopting a consequentialist normative approach251 to determine whether fertility 
treatment costs should be deductible, we must consider the ex ante incentive effects of 
characterizing fertility treatment costs as medical expenses or non-medical expenses.252
244 Id.
245
 McCullough, supra note 141.
246
 Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 363
(1998).
247
 Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v. 
Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 189 (1998-99).
248 Id. at 180.
249 Theories of Personal Deductions, supra note 203, at 370, 385. At times, Andrews seems to be 
adopting an egalitarian ethic and at other times he seems to be adopting a utilitarian ethic.  Id. at 370.
250
 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1627, 1649-51 (1999) [hereinafter Line Drawing]; David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis 
of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 74 (2000).
251
 There are various consequentialist theories that we could apply, including utilitiarian theories or 
Rawlsian theories.
252 Income Tax as Insurance, supra note 203. We note the second-best setting within which we are 
trying to make this normative determination. Again, our normative starting point assumes that we 
have a § 213 deduction and a patchwork of direct medical subsidies. The only question is how we 
should characterize fertility treatment costs.
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Allowing the deduction (or reimbursement) would encourage fertility treatment by 
reducing the cost of such treatment; not allowing the deduction would discourage fertility 
treatment by increasing the cost of such treatment.   If we allow the deduction for certain 
treatments, but not others, we would discourage the treatments with nondeductible 
treatment costs and encourage the treatments with deductible treatment costs.  (Note at 
the outset of this normative discussion that, since section 213 is a deduction, not a credit, 
it is, in effect like an insurance co-pay, because the tax savings from the medical expense 
deduction equal the product of the dollar amount of the deduction multiplied by the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.)
We might want to encourage all fertility treatment, or certain types of fertility 
treatments, if: (1) fertility treatments are being underutilized, given the general lack of 
insurance coverage and extreme importance of reproduction; (2) infertile patients choose 
to undergo treatment that is covered by insurance, instead of pursuing less expensive, 
painful, or invasive procedures that are not covered by insurance; (3) the success rates for 
certain forms of fertility treatment are dramatically higher than the success rates for other 
forms of fertility treatment; and (4) the risk of multi-fetal pregnancies, to both the woman 
bearing the children and the children, are lower for certain forms of fertility treatment 
than for other forms. 
On the other hand, we might want to discourage all fertility treatments, or certain 
types of fertility treatment, for example, if:  (1) ovarian stimulation poses health risks to 
the woman whose ovaries are being stimulated; (2) ovarian stimulation increases the rate 
of multi-fetal pregnancies, which poses health risks to the woman bearing the children 
and the children; (3) fertility treatment poses other health risks or psychological risks to 
the children conceived; (4) infertile patients overestimate the success rates for fertility 
treatment or underestimate the health risks of multi-fetal pregnancies; or (5) adoption is a 
better alternative.  We will consider the positive and negative consequences of various 
forms of fertility treatments in turn.
1. The consequences of fertility treatment that have a positive impact on 
welfare.
a. The benefits of fertility treatment to the parents and child.
Fertility treatment dramatically improves the welfare of the intended parents.  Part 
II.A. of this article documents the core despondence of infertile patients.  That despair 
stands in stark contrast to the happiness of those who want to have children and are able 
to have them.  Poetry captures the elemental experience of having children – for both 
men and women:
Ten thousand parks where dear run,
Ten thousand roses in the sun,
Ten thousand pearls beneath the sea,
My baby more precious is to me.253
253 Mother Song (E. Nesbit trans.), in E. NESBIT, THE RAINBOW AND THE ROSE 69-70 
(Longmans, Green & Co. 1905).  Many other poems also describe the joy of parenting.
There is a calm upon her face
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That marks the change that’s taken place:
It seems as though her eyes now see
The wonder things that are to be,
An’ that her gentle hands now own
A gentleness before unknown.
Her laughter has a clearer ring
Than all the bubbling of a spring,
An’ in her cheeks love’s tender flame
Glows brighter since the baby came. . . .
How sweet she was, an’ yet how much
She sweetened by the magic touch
That made her a mother!  In her face
It seems the angels left a trace
Of Heavenly beauty to remain
Where once had been the lines of pain
An’ with the baby in her arms
Enriched her with a thousand charms
EDGAR ALBERT GUEST, Sue’s Got A Baby, in EDGAR A. GUEST, JUST FOLKS 134-135 (The 
Reilly & Lee Co. 1917).
Give me the baby to hold my dear –
  To hold and hug, and to love and kiss.
Ah!  He will come to me, never a fear –
  Come to the nest of a breast like this,
As warm for him as his face with cheer.
Give me the baby to hold my dear!
Trustfully yield him to my caress. . . .
To fill up my soul with such happiness
  As the love of a baby that laughs to be
Snuggled away where my heart can hear!
Give me the baby to hold, my dear!
JAMES WHITCOMB RILEY, Give Me the Baby, in JAMES WHITCOMB RILEY, THE COMPLETE 
POETICAL WORKS OF JAMES WHITCOMB RILEY 299-300 (Indiana University Press 1993).
I have no wish, my little lad,
To climb the towering heights of fame.
I am content to be your dad
And share with you each pleasant game.
I am content to hold your hand
And walk along life's path with you,
And talk of things we understand -
The birds and trees and skies of blue.
Though some may seek the smiles of kings,
For me your laughter's joy enough;
I have no wish to claim the things
Which lure men into pathways rough.
I'm happiest when you and I,
Unmindful of life's bitter cares,
Together watch the clouds drift by, . . .
I would not trade one day with you
To wear the purple robes of power,
Nor drop your hand from mine to do
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Infertile patients prefer to have a genetic, gestational, and nurturing connection to 
their child.  If their physiology prevents them from having all three, they are often quite 
happy to have the nurturing connection and whichever of the other two is physiologically 
possible; in other words, they will often be happy to have a child with the assistance of a 
third-party sperm donor, egg donor, or surrogate.
The financial sacrifices that infertile patients make to pay for fertility treatment 
provide an indication of the vital importance of fertility treatment to infertile patients.  
Numerous studies have demonstrated that infertile patients are prepared to pay dearly to 
increase their chances of conceiving and bearing a child.  For example, survey 
respondents in a U.K. study “were willing to pay 29 percent of their after-tax income for 
a 50 percent chance of having a child, and willing to risk a 20 percent chance of death in 
order to have a child.”254
Professor Weisbach has argued that we should draw lines in the tax law in a 
manner that minimizes deadweight losses.255  Studies such as the U.K. study demonstrate
the paramount importance of fertility treatment to infertile patients,256 and suggest that 
permitting a deduction for fertility treatment will not increase deadweight losses.257  If 
fertility treatment is not covered by insurance and the cost of such treatment is not 
deductible, on the other hand, patients will be encouraged to either: (1) opt for less 
effective medical treatment that is covered by insurance;258 or (2) be very aggressive in 
their fertility treatment, which increases the risk of a multi-fetal pregnancy.259
Disallowing the deduction would thus likely increase deadweight losses. 
Some great deed in a selfish hour.
For you have brought me joy serene
And made my soul supremely glad.
In life rewarded I have been;
'Twas all worth while to be your dad.
EDGAR ALBERT GUEST, To The Boy, in EDGAR A. GUEST, THE PATH TO HOME 156-157 (The 
Reilly & Lee Co. 1919).
254
 Neumann, supra note 88, at 1223-24.
255
 Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 250, at 1651.  Weisbach argues that we should draw lines in 
the tax law to maximize efficiency, and notes that “[a]n efficient tax is simply a tax with low 
deadweight loss.”  Id. The deadweight loss of a tax is “the loss in value to consumers in excess of the 
revenue raised by the government.” Id.
256
 Neumann, supra note 88, at 1223-24.
257
 As Weisbach notes, 
[T]he size of the deadweight loss from a tax on an item is related to the elasticity of demand 
of the item.  The greater the elasticity, the more the demand changes for a change in price, 
and consequently the greater the economic distortion.” 
Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 250, at 1656. Studies such as the U.K. study indicate that the 
elasticity of demand of fertility treatment is relatively low.
258
 For example, patients with blocked fallopian tubes will opt for surgery to repair the blocked tubes, 
because the surgery is covered by insurance, instead of bypassing the blocked tubes with an IVF 
procedure. The surgery is less effective medically than the IVF procedure.
259
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Fertility treatment also improves the welfare of the children who would not have 
been born but for fertility treatment. The magnitude of this effect on the consequentialist 
conclusion depends on the specific consequentialist approach employed.260
Peter Neumann, a public health expert, computes the cost of IVF per life-year 
gained for a child conceived through IVF and compares it to the cost per life-year of 
other common medical treatments.261  In Neumann’s example, he assumes that a cycle of 
IVF costs $8,000 and has a 12 percent chance of success, and that a child would live 75 
years.262  The cost per life-year gained from IVF, given these assumptions, equals 
$3,259.263  The cost per life-year gained for many other common types of medical 
treatment is much higher.  Consider the cost per life-year gained for the following 
treatments: (1) $23,000 for kidney dialysis; (2) $28,000 for a two-vessel coronary artery 
bypass surgery (for the cost in excess of the cost of medical management); (3) $100,000 
for a heart transplant for 50 year-old patients with terminal heart disease; (4) $300,000 
for intensive care for very sick patients having major vascular surgery; and (5) $2,700 for 
mammography every three years for women ages 50-65.264
Neumann’s cost per life-year estimate may have to be adjusted upward because 
we may value life-years of unborn people less than life-years of people who have already 
been born.  On the other hand, his cost per life-year estimate may have to be adjusted 
downward because his estimate fails to take into account the benefits to the child’s 
parents.265
b. Adoption as an alternative to fertility treatment.
Adoptive parents also experience the joy of parenting. Infertile would-be parents 
often consider adoption as an alternative to fertility treatment.266  As Elizabeth Bartholet 
has noted, they typically consider adoption only as a last resort after they “have reached 
the end of a long medical road designed to produce a biological child.”267  Many infertile 
couples who decide to adopt only want to adopt a healthy white baby.268  In one study, 
only half of the parents adopting special needs children gave infertility as the reason for 
the adoption.  On the other hand, over 80 percent of parents adopting a child through a 
260
 For example, utilitarians sometimes look to total utility and sometimes look to average utility.
261 Id. at 1222-23.
262 Id. at 1222-23.
263 Id. at 1223.
264 Id. at 1224.
265 Id.
266
 A study that covered the period from 1988 to 1995 estimated that 11 percent to 24 percent of 
infertile couples decide to adopt.  The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Overview of Adoption, 
at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/html (last visited July 9, 2003), citing William D. 
Mosher & Christine Bachrach, Understanding U.S. Fertility: Continuity and Change in the National 
Survey of Family Growth, 1988-1995, 27(1) FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1996). 
267 ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF 
CHILD PRODUCTION 24 (1999) [hereinafter BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS].
268 MAURA A, RYAN, THE ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE COST OF 
LONGING 59 (2001). Ryan notes that they want to adopt healthy white babies “for both good and bad 
reasons.” Id.
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private adoption agency or independently gave infertility as the reason for the 
adoption.269
Maura Ryan has noted that we should not simply “assume that adoption is the 
obvious and unambiguous solution to the problem of infertility.”270  Infertile adoptive 
parents reach the decision to adopt only after experiencing the devastating losses 
associated with their infertility.  Elizabeth Bartholet has observed that many infertile 
people “will find that after years of struggling to conquer infertility, they are too old, or 
too tired, or too poor, or too broken in spirit, to begin another uphill battle, and that of 
course is what adoption is.”271  Maura Ryan argues:
To make a blanket assumption that infertility should be resolved by 
adoption neglects the individual nature of the process of healing and the 
fact that not all infertile people will come to the place where they are able 
to positively embrace adoption. The many adoptable children who have 
special needs of some kind are not necessarily going to be well taken care 
of by someone for whom adoption is not really a positive and free choice. . 
. .  [O]ne could argue for a greater obligation to adopt on the part of the 
fertile who would not, in principle, begin with the same vulnerabilities.272
Sociobiologists have long noted the basic human urge to reproduce,273 but 
Bartholet argues that societal forces are also at work in making adoption less desirable 
than bearing a biological child.274 Bartholet recognizes that those who are infertile 
naturally want to seek medical attention to try to overcome the infertility.275  She argues, 
however, that infertile patients who begin medical treatment often have trouble deciding 
when to stop the medical treatment of their infertility.  The information that is most 
available to infertile patients is biased in favor of medical treatment and against 
adoption.276  In addition, adoption is highly regulated, but the medical treatment of 
269
 The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Overview of Adoption, at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/html (last visited July 9, 2003), citing Berry et al., 
Preparation, Support and Satisfaction of Adoptive Families in Agency and Independent Adoptions, 
13(2) CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL 166 (April 1966).
270 RYAN, supra note 268, at 57.
271 BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 267, at 36.
272 Id. at 58.
273 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
274 BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 267, at 24:
Adoption is the choice of last resort for most infertile men and women who want to 
parent.  If asked why this is true, many would say, “Because it is natural to want 
your own child.” But it is hard to know what is natural, given the fact that society 
weighs in to make adoption the last resort.  And it is not clear that we should 
characterize parenting decisions as the product of choice.  We are all conditioned 
from early childhood to equate personhood with procreation and procreation with 
parenting.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)
275 Id. at 30.
276 Id. at 32. Infertile patients are most often advised by their fertility doctors, who often know little 
about adoption as an alternative to medical treatment.  Adoption agencies are wary of infertile 
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infertility is essentially unregulated.277  Bartholet argues that we should promote adoption 
as an alternative to the medical treatment of infertility.278
On the other hand, pursuing adoption can also be a difficult, expensive, and 
uncertain process.  There is a shortage of healthy children available for adoption in the 
U.S.  Adolescent birth rates have declined significantly.279  In addition, only about 1 
percent of American women give up their babies for adoption.280  As a result of this baby 
shortage, adoptive parents typically have to wait years to adopt a healthy American 
baby.281  Adoptive parents can adopt special needs children282 more quickly, but many 
adoptive parents feel that they cannot respond adequately to the needs of such children.283
couples, who may proceed with adoption before they have resolved their feelings of grief and loss.  
Id. at 31.
277 Id. at 33:
Those entering the world of adoption agencies and home studies 
quickly realize that they have no right to become adoptive parents.  Parental 
screening is the essence of what traditional adoption is all about, with the 
government determining through its agents who should be disqualified 
altogether from the parenting opportunity and then how those who are 
qualified should be rated for purposes of allocating the available children. . . 
.
The parental screening requirement is a very real deterrent to many 
who might otherwise consider adoption.  People don’t like to become 
helpless supplicants, utterly dependent on the grace of social workers, with 
respect to something as basic as their desire to become parents.  Screening 
also adds to the financial costs of adoption. . . . 
Regulation also sends a powerful message about the essential 
inferiority of adoption as a form of parenting.  By subjecting adoptive but 
not biologic parents to regulation, society suggests that it trusts what goes 
on people give birth and raise a birth child but profoundly distrusts what 
goes on when a child is transferred from a birth to an adoptive parent.
Id. at 33-34.
278 Id. at 37. 
279
 Paula Span, Parallel Lives; Nicole’s 16 and Pregnant, Otto and Chanda are Desperate to Adopt, 
WASHINGTON POST, June 18, 2000, at W12 (noting an 18 percent decline in the adolescent birth rate 
since 1991).  
280 Id. During the 1950s and 1960s, 40-50 percent of unmarried women in the U.S. gave up their 
babies for adoption.  Id.  Today, only 1 percent of women give up their babies for adoption.  There 
are various reasons for the dramatic reduction in relinquishment rates.  First, single parenthood 
carries much less of a social stigma today.  Span also notes that sensational press accounts of the 
emotional difficulties of adopted children have made adoption seem to be a poor choice for the 
biological mother and child.  Few adolescent mothers seriously consider adoption or think about how 
adoption might benefit both the biological mother and child.  Id.
281 Id. (such adoptive parents face a wait of two to seven years).
282
 A special needs child is a child with a “specific factor or condition (such as his ethnic background, 
age, or membership in a minority or sibling group, or the presence of factors such as medical 
conditions or physical, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of which it is reasonable to conclude 
that such child cannot be placed with adoptive parents without providing adoption assistance…or 
medical assistance.” Social Security Act § 473(c), 42 U.S.C. § 673(c) (2000).
283
 Span, supra note 279.
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The wait for adoption is also frequently shorter for the adoption of foreign babies and 
children.284
Adoptions also involve uncertainty because a biological mother often decides, 
after the child is born, to keep the child.285  Adoptive parents who have paid the birth 
expenses of the biological mother are often not reimbursed for those expenses.286
Adoption of non-special needs children is costly.  The cost of adoption from 
private agencies or independent adoption, including international adoption, range from 
$4,000 to $30,000.287  (For public agency adoptions, which typically involve special 
needs children, costs range from zero to $2,500.288  In addition, parents who adopt special 
needs children can qualify for government reimbursement of their adoption expenses.289)
In 1996, Congress also enacted two tax provisions, sections 23 and 137, to 
encourage adoption.290  Section 23 currently provides that adoptive parents can claim a 
tax credit of up to $10,000 for adoption expenses.291  Section 137 currently allows 
employees to exclude up to $10,000 of adoption expenses reimbursed from an employer-
provided adoption assistance program.292  Both provisions can apply to a single adoption, 
but cannot apply to the same adoption expenses.  The section 23 credit is phased out if 
the parents have gross income between $150,000 and $190,000.293  Parents with income 
of $190,000 or more cannot qualify for the credit.294  If the section 23 credit exceeds the 
parents’ tax liability for the year in which the credit is taken, the parents may carry over 
the unused portion of the credit to the next year.295
Due to the shortage of non-foreign, non-special needs children available for 
adoption, these tax benefits have probably not increased the number of such adoptions.296
It is not clear whether these tax benefits have affected the number of special needs 
adoptions.297  The cost of special needs adoptions is lower than the cost of non-special 
needs adoptions.298  In 85 percent of special needs adoptions, direct government subsidies 
284 Id. (international adoption is a quicker process).
285
 Lord et al., supra note 12, at 58.
286
 National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Cost of Adopting, at 
http://www.calib.com/naic/pubs/s_cost.cfm (last modified Jan. 28, 2003) (last visited July 9, 2003).
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 The Social Security Act provides for payments to states so that states can reimburse adoptive 
parents for the costs of adopting special needs children.  Social Security Act § 470, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, 
673 (2000).  Parents can receive additional federal assistance if the adopted child was eligible for 
other forms of federal assistance prior to the adoption.  The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, 
Costs of Adoption, at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/costs.html (last visited July 9, 
2003).
290
 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188 § 1807, 110 Stat. 1757 (1996).
291
 I.R.C. § 23 (2000) (amended 2001). 
292
 I.R.C. § 137 (2000) (amended 2001).
293
 I.R.C. § 23(b) (2000) (amended 2001).
294 Id.
295
 I.R.C. § 23(c) (2000) (amended 2001).
296 DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON TAX BENEFITS FOR ADOPTION 18 (Oct. 
2000).
297 Id. The number of special needs adoptions has increased, but it is not clear how much such 
adoptions would have increased without the tax incentives of §§ 37 and 137.
298 Id. at 3, 18.
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cover the adoptive parents’ out-of-pocket expenses, so special needs adoptions generate 
tax benefits in only 15 percent of such cases.299
The tax benefits of sections 23 and 137 may have increased the number of foreign 
adoptions. The number of foreign adoptions has been increasing in recent years.  
Although such adoptions began to increase before 1996, the number of foreign adoptions 
has continued to increase since 1996.300  Foreign adoptions are more costly than U.S. 
adoptions.  The Treasury Department estimates that, in 1998, the average cost of a 
foreign adoption was almost twice the cost of a non-foreign adoption.301  Sections 23 and 
137 therefore provide greater tax benefits for foreign-adoptions than for special needs 
adoptions.302  Given the greater tax benefit for foreign adoptions, sections 23 and 137 
may have increased the number of such adoptions.
The tax law currently favors adoption over fertility treatment, even if fertility 
treatment expenses are characterized as medical expenses.  This is, in part, because 
section 23 provides for a credit, while section 213 provides for a deduction.303 Consider 
the following example to illustrate the comparative tax benefits of the section 23 credit 
and the section 213 medical expense deduction. 
Example:  Lee and Shannon are infertile.  They are deciding whether to 
adopt a foreign child or do a cycle of IVF.  The cost of either option is 
$10,000. Assume that their gross income for the year is $100,000 and their 
marginal tax rate is 30 percent.  If they adopt, they can claim a section 23 
credit of $10,000.  The credit saves them $10,000 in taxes and reduces 
their net adoption cost to zero.  If they do the IVF cycle and take a section
213 medical expense deduction, the deduction will be $2,500 (their 
$10,000 medical expense less $7,500, which is 7.5 percent of their gross 
income304).  The $2,500 deduction will save them $750 ($2,500 deduction 
multiplied by the 30 percent tax rate) in taxes.  Their net cost for the IVF 
procedure is $9,250 ($10,000 less $250 tax savings).305
299 Id. at 3.
300
 There have been around: 6,500 international adoptions in 1992; 7,300 in 1993; 8,300 in 1994; 
9,700 in 1995; 11,300 in 1996; 13,600 in 1997; 15,600 in 1997; 16,400 in 1999; 18,500 in 2000; and 
19,200 in 2001.  The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Overview of Adoption, available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/html (last visited July 9, 2003).
301 Id. at 3.  The Treasury Department estimated that the average cost of foreign adoption was 
$10,000 in 1998.  Note that the actual average cost may have been higher.  The tax benefits of §§ 23 
and 137 are subject to gross income phaseouts, so the figures in the Treasury report do not reflect the 
cost of adoption by higher income families.
302 Id. at 18.
303 A credit reduces the taxpayer’s tax owed by the dollar amount of the credit.  A deduction reduces 
a taxpayer’s taxable income, on which tax is computed.  The tax savings from a deduction depend on 
the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.  The tax savings from a deduction equal the product of the dollar 
amount of the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.
304
 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2000).
305
 The relative advantage of the credit is reduced if the adoption costs exceed $10,000, or if the 
taxpayer’s gross income is more than $150,000.  I.R.C. § 23 (2000) (amended 2001).
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Both fertility treatment and adoption can have a significant positive impact on 
welfare. Next we will consider the potential negative impact of fertility treatment on 
welfare.
2. The consequences of fertility treatment that have a negative impact on 
welfare.
a. The medical and psychological risks of fertility treatment. 
Even without fertility treatment, pregnancy, labor, and delivery entail medical 
risks to the mother and child.306  In addition, the various surgical procedures employed to 
diagnose, cure, or treat infertile patients involve the normal medical risks associated with 
surgery.307  This section will address the risks that increase or may increase as a result of 
ovulation induction, high-tech treatments such as IVF, and ICSI.308   The known and 
potential risks of these fertility treatments include risks to: (1) the woman whose ovaries 
are being stimulated; (2) the woman gestating the child or children; and (3) the child or 
children being gestated.
i. The medical risks to the woman whose ovaries are being stimulated.
(A) The risk of hyperstimulation.
Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, a condition in which fluid accumulates in 
the abdomen, is the main risk to the woman whose ovaries are being stimulated by 
fertility drugs.309 The fluid accumulated in the abdomen puts pressure on the surrounding 
organs, including the heart and lungs.310  Hyperstimulation can also cause dehydration, 
which can in turn cause kidney damage or dangerous blood clots.311  The fertility 
specialist closely monitors patients showing symptoms of hyperstimulation.312  The 
306
 The risks of pregnancy and delivery increase as women get older. HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, 
supra note 35, at 160. “The risks of pregnancy-related death and of hypertension, diabetes, and 
complicated delivery all rise as women age.  Many older women are prepared to accept these risks, 
but they need to be carefully monitored during their pregnancies.”  Id.
307 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 276.
308
 The increased pregnancy and delivery risks of fertility treatment may be intertwined with the 
increased pregnancy and delivery risks associated with infertility.  Infertility, by itself, sometimes 
increases the medical risks of pregnancy and delivery because certain underlying causes of infertility 
increase specific pregnancy and delivery risks.  HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 276-77.  
For example, women with disorders of the fallopian tubes and women exposed to DES in utero have 
a higher risk of ectopic pregnancy.  Id. at 278.  Fertile surrogates who gestate children are not subject 
to these increased risks.
309 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 114. 
310 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 264.
311 Id. at 265.
312
 The symptoms of hyperstimulation are shortness of breath, nausea, weight gain of over a 
pound a day, decreased urine output, and pronounced abdominal swelling. RESOLVING 
INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 106, 114.
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patient may have to rest in bed or, in more extreme cases, be hospitalized.313
Hyperstimulation is rare,314 but certain groups of women are known to be more 
susceptible to hyperstimulation.315  The fertility specialist can reduce the risk of 
hyperstimulation by monitoring blood estrogen levels during the ovarian stimulation and 
altering the course of treatment if blood estrogen levels are high.316
(B) The uncertainty regarding the increased risk of ovarian cancer.
Some medical researchers have posited that ovarian stimulation may increase a 
woman’s risk of developing ovarian cancer, but the link between ovarian stimulation and 
increased cancer risk has not been established. Several studies have concluded that 
ovarian stimulation does increase ovarian cancer risk.  The most widely publicized of 
these studies is the 1992 Whittemore study.317  This study drew the conclusion that, 
compared to fertile women, infertile women whose ovaries had been stimulated had 
almost three times the lifetime risk of developing ovarian cancer.318  On the other hand, 
numerous organizations, including the National Cancer Insitute and the FDA, have 
criticized the methodology and conclusions in the Whittemore study.319  In addition, 
numerous subsequent studies have failed to establish a connection between ovarian 
stimulation and ovarian cancer.320
In another well-known study, the 1994 Rossing study, the researchers concluded 
that prolonged use of clomiphene citrate (the ovarian stimulation drug that is in pill form) 
313
 Severe hyperstimulation can be fatal, especially if untreated, but this is quite rare. HIGH-TECH 
CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 265.
314
 Hyperstimulation occurs in 1 to 5 percent of stimulated cyles.  RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra
note 2, at 114. Severe hyperstimulation occurs in 0.4 percent to 1.3 percent of cases. HIGH-TECH 
CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 265.
315
 The women at higher risk include women who: (1) have polycystic ovarian syndrome (PCOS); 
(2) are very thin; (3) are age 34 or younger; or (4) have a history of producing over 30 follicles or 
high blood estrogen levels in previous stimulation cycles. HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, 
at 265.
316 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 114.  If a patient has very high blood estrogen levels, 
the doctor may cancel the cycle or continue the cycle but stop the stimulation drugs.  Id.
The risk of hyperstimulation is increased if the patient becomes pregnant while hyperstimulated.
HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 265.  If a patient has blood estrogen levels, the doctor 
may decide to delay the transfer of embryos.  The doctor can retrieve the eggs, fertilize them, 
cryopreserve them, then transfer them after the ovarian swelling has subsided.  Id. at 266.
317
 Alice S. Whittemore, et al., Characteristics Relating to Ovarian Cancer Risk:  Collaborative 
Analysis of 12 US Case-Control Studies, 136 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1175 (Nov. 15, 1992).
318 Id. at 1188.
319 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 269. 
320 See, e.g., Baruch Modan et al., Cancer Incidence in a Cohort of Infertile Women, 147 AM. J. OF 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1038, 1042 (June 1, 1998) (concluding that their data do not suggest that stimulation 
drugs increase the risk of ovarian cancer); Gad Potashnik et al., Fertility drugs and the risk of breast 
and ovarian cancers: results of a long-term follow-up study, 71 FERTILITY & STERILITY 853 (May, 
1999) (concluding that “[a]n association between the use of fertility drugs and an increased risk of 
breast and ovarian cancers has not been confirmed”).  Kearney notes that these studies involved 
relatively small samples, so the issue probably warrants further study. HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, 
supra note 35, at 270.
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may increase the risk of ovarian cancer.321  The methodology of the Rossing study had 
fewer drawbacks than did the Whittemore study, but still had some limitations.322  In 
addition, the study looked to the risk associated with using clomiphene for 12 or more 
cycles, but the medical consensus is that clomiphene should not be used nearly that many 
times.323
Numerous other studies have posited that infertility, whether treated or not, 
increases a woman’s risk of ovarian cancer.324  Given that fact, the relationship between 
ovulation drugs and ovarian cancer may only be a correlation, not a cause-effect 
relationship. 
Researchers will continue to study the potential relationship between ovulation 
stimulation and ovarian cancer.  In the meantime, in the words of one expert 
commentator:
None of these studies, either alone or together, conclusively demonstrates 
a link between ovulation drugs and ovarian cancer, but neither can the risk 
be entirely discounted.  Based on what we know now, should a woman 
avoid using ovulation drugs and rely on natural cycles to produce eggs for 
fertilization?  Most physicians would say no. . . .  Pregnancy and 
childbirth have always been risky, but most women are willing to assume 
the risk in order to have children.325
A 1997 study bears out this last statement.  The study indicates that about 80
percent of women requiring fertility treatment indicated that they would take ovulation 
induction drugs even if the drugs slightly increased their risk of ovarian cancer.326
In addition, there are certain things a woman may be able to do to reduce her risk 
of ovarian cancer, including taking oral contraceptives or carrying a pregnancy to term.  
Various studies indicate that the risk of ovarian cancer is reduced by use of oral 
321
 M.A. Rossing, et al., Ovarian Tumors in a Cohort of Infertile Women, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED.
771, 776 (Sept. 22, 1994).
322 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 271.  Kearney discusses the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Rossing study.  For example, he notes that the study did not control for the use of oral 
contraceptives, which reduces the risk of ovarian cancer.  Id.
323 Id. at 271 (saying that clomiphene “should never be used” for 12 cycles and adding: “[f]ew 
women use clomiphene for more than six cycles and those who do should be looking for a new 
doctor”).
324 See, e.g., Robert E. Bristow & Beth Y. Karlan, Ovulation induction, infertility, and ovarian 
cancer risk, 66(4) FERTILITY & STERILITY 499 (Oct., 1996); Carmen Rodriguez et al., Infertility 
and the Risk of Fatal Ovarian Cancer in a Prospective Cohort of US Women, 9(6)CANCER 
CAUSES & CONTROL (Dec. 9, 1998); Lynette Burmeister & David L. Healy, Ovarian Cancer in 
Infertility Patients, 30(6) ANNALS OF MED. 525 (Dec. 1998).
325 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 272.
326
 Barry Rosen et al., The Feasibility of Assessing Women’s Perceptions of the Risks and Benefits of 
Fertility Drug Therapy in Relation to Ovarian Cancer Risk, 68(1) FERTILITY & STERILITY 90 (July, 
1997).  The article notes that only 24 percent of the women in the study understood that ovarian 
cancer is usually fatal. 
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contraceptives over a period of years.327  Other studies considering the relationship 
between pregnancy and ovarian cancer indicate that, the more recently a woman has 
given birth, the lower her risk of ovarian cancer.328 The theory behind this phenomenon is 
that pregnancy somehow reverses malignant transformations in the ovaries.329
Taking birth control pills may be unacceptable to an infertile woman who 
continues to want to bear a child.  In these situations, bearing a child may be the only 
acceptable way for the infertile woman to reduce her ovarian cancer risk.  If the infertility 
is caused by an ovulation disorder, the infertile woman may have a much better chance of 
bearing a child if she enlists the assistance of an egg donor.  Whether stimulation 
increases ovarian cancer risk or not, the cancer risk of egg donors would be reduced if 
they later took oral contraceptives or had a child.
ii. The medical risks of multi-fetal pregnancies to the children and the 
gestating woman. 
(A) The medical risks of multi-fetal pregnancies.
Fertility treatment, especially ovulation induction with clomiphene, greatly 
increases the risk of pregnancies involving multiple fetuses.330 The risks of twin 
pregnancies are significantly higher than the risks of singleton pregnancies and the risks 
of triplet or other higher-order pregnancies are dramatically higher than the risks of 
singleton pregnancies.331  In recent years, however, fertility specialists have begun to 
develop new protocols to reduce the risk of multiples.  
Multi-fetal pregnancies are riskier both for the woman gestating the fetuses and 
the fetuses.  For example, woman gestating multiples are much more likely to suffer from 
gestational hypertension severe enough to require hospitalization; 15 percent of women 
gestating twins and 30 percent of women gestating triplets have to be hospitalized for this 
condition.332  Multiple fetuses also increase the risk of cesarean delivery.333
The risks to the fetuses are even more distressing.  Compared to singletons, 
multiples have a significantly higher risk of still birth.334  The risk of preterm delivery 
and low birth weight is also much higher in multi-fetal pregnancies, especially triplet and 
327 See, e.g., Christine H. Holschneider & Jonathan S. Berek, Ovarian Cancer:  Epidemiology, 
Biology, and Prognostic Factors, 18 SEMINARS IN SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 3 (July-Aug. 2000).
328
 Francesca Chiaffarino et al., Time Since Last Birth and the Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 81(2) 
GYNECOLOGIC ONCOLOGY 233-236 (May 1, 2001) (being pregnant later in life reduces ovarian 
cancer risk); On the other hand, being pregnant early in life and increased number of years since last 
pregnancy are associated with an increased ovarian cancer risk. Glinda S. Cooper et al., Pregnancy 
Recency and Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 10 CANCER CAUSES CONTROL 397 (1999).
329
 Cooper et al., supra note 328, at 397-402.
330 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 115-16.
331 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 283-84.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334
 William N. Spellacy et al., A Case-Control Study of 1253 Twin Pregnancies From a 1982-
1987 Perinatal Data Base, 75(2) OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 168 (Feb. 1990). 
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higher-order pregnancies.335  Low birth weight babies in turn have a much higher risk of 
cerebral palsy.336  Multiples also have a higher risk of congenital abnormalities and 
certain diseases.337  Compared to singletons, twins are five times more likely to die 
during the first year of life and triplets and other higher-order multiples are 13 times as 
likely to die during the first year of life.338  Largely due to the increased medical risks of 
multi-fetal pregnancies, the medical costs of multi-fetal pregnancies are significantly 
higher than the medical costs of delivering singletons; the cost of a triplet delivery is 
often over $100,000339 and, in some cases, can be more than $1 million.340
Fertility treatment involving ovarian stimulation increases the risk of multiples.341
Ovarian induction with clomiphene causes a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple egg 
follicles.  Typically, a patient taking clomiphene would attempt to fertilize the eggs either 
by intercourse or artificial insemination.  In such cases, many of the eggs may fertilize.  
Ovarian stimulation by injectable gonadotropins also causes a woman’s ovaries to 
produce multiple egg follicles.  Patients injecting gonadotropins typically try to fertilize 
the eggs and implant the embryos in an IVF procedure.  In an IVF procedure, the fertility 
specialist can determine how many embryos to implant.  Physicians trying to decide how 
many embryos to implant have to consider two competing concerns. Infertile patients are 
often financially constrained by the high costs of IVF, so they encourage their fertility 
doctors to transfer as many embryos as possible in the hope of increasing their chances of 
getting pregnant.   Infertile patients are usually delighted at the prospect of twins and are 
willing to risk triplets to increase their chances of having a child.342
335
 Laura A. Schieve et al., Live-Birth Rates and Multiple-Birth Risk Using In Vitro Fertilization, 282 
JAMA 1832 (Nov. 17, 1999); Michael O. Gardner et al., The Origin and Outcome of Preterm Twin 
Pregnancies, 85(4) OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 553 (April 1995). Thirty to fifty percent of  twin 
deliveries are preterm and 75 to 100 percent of triplet or higher-order deliveries are preterm.  HIGH-
TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 283.  Over half of twins and 75 percent of triplets are low birth 
weight.  Id.
336 P.O. Pharoah & T. Cooke, Cerebral Palsy and Multiple Births, 75(3) ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN 
CHILDHOOD (FETAL AND NEONATAL ED.) 174 (NOV. 1996).  HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 
35, at 284.  “[T]he risk of cerebral palsy is about eight times higher for twins and forty-seven times 
higher for triplets than for singleton births.” Id.
337
 William N. Spellacy et al., A Case-Control Study of 1253 Twin Pregnancies From a 1982-
1987 Perinatal Data Base, 75(2) OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 168 (Feb. 1990). Low birth 
weight babies have a higher risk of “cardiovascular disease, diabetes, abnormal blood clotting, 
excessive fat, or obstructive lung disease later in life.” HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, 
at 284.
338
 Schieve et al., supra note 338.
339
 McCullough, supra note 141.
340
 Jamie Malernee, Blastocyst Transfer, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1999, at 7C.
341
 Allan Templeton & Joan K. Morris, Reducing the Risk of Multiple Births by Transfer of Two 
Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization, 339(9) NEW ENG. J. MED. 573-77 (Aug. 27, 1998).
342 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 282.  Kearney notes that having triplets is more 
difficult than patients realize.  He cites a study in which all of the mothers of the 11 sets of triplets in 
the study “reported fatigue, emotional distress, and difficult relationships with their children even 
four years after birth.”  Id. at 284-85.  Four of the mothers in the study said they regretted having 
triplets.  Id. at 285.
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Over the past decade, multiple birth rates have been increasing as a result of 
fertility treatment.343  In 1995, 40 percent of multi-fetal pregnancies were attributable to 
ovulation induction without IVF and 40 percent were attributable to stimulation with 
IVF.344 The medical community has expressed serious concerns about rising multiple 
birth rates and called for the adoption of measures to decrease the risk of multiples.345
(B) The development of new protocols to reduce the risks of multi-fetal 
pregnancies.
In recent years, numerous researchers, including doctors from the Centers for 
Disease Control, have been studying the relationship between fertility treatment and the 
risk of multiples to try to establish new protocols to reduce the risk of multiples. 
The recent IVF research has been promising.  In numerous studies, researchers 
have discovered that they can now better predict the risk of multiples in IVF procedures 
based on: (1) the number of embryos transferred; (2) the age of the eggs (the age of a 
mother’s eggs or donor’s eggs); and (3) the quality of the embryos from which the doctor 
can select those to implant.346  Various studies have made recommendations about the 
optimal number of embryos to transfer, in order to balance the patient’s interest in 
maximizing pregnancy rates and the risks of multi-fetal pregnancies.347
Data for 1998 indicate that fertility doctors transferred fewer embyros per cycle 
than in earlier years.348  For example, the average number of embryos transferred for 
patients age 34 or younger dropped from 4 embryos per cycle in 1995 to 3.4 embryos per 
cycle in 1998.  This drop in the number of embryos transferred did not reduce the rate of 
343
 McCullough, supra note 141. Richard L. Paulson, 35 ASRM NEWS 7 (Spring 2001) (“the 
incidence of triplet and higher-order multiple births in the United States increased from 29 per 
100,00 in 1971 to 174 per 100,000 in 1997”).
344
 Paulson, supra note 343.
345 See, e.g., Paulson, supra note 343, at 7 (“The high incidence of multiple gestations following 
assisted reproductive technologies (ART’s) is perhaps the most vexing problem confronting the 
reproductive endocrinologist today. . . .  The most obvious strategy to [reduce the risk of multiples] 
involves transferring fewer embryos. . . . However, since pregnancy rates are directly related to the 
number of embryos transferred, this approach also decreases the clinical pregnancy rates.”)
346 See, e.g., Schieve et al., supra note 335.
347
 One study concluded that, where the ovarian stimulation resulted in at least four embryos, 
transferring more than two good-quality embryos did not increase the birth rate but substantially 
increased the multiple birth rate.  Templeton & Morris, supra note 341, at 573-77.  Another study 
concluded that: (1) for women age 35 or younger, the optimal number of embryos to transfer is two 
to four depending on egg quality; and (2) for women age 40 or older, the optimal number of embryos 
to transfer is up to five regardless of quality. Another study concluded that the optimal number of 
embryos to transfer was limited to three, even for older women, where there were at least four 
embyros. Selim Senoz et al., An IVF Fallacy:  Multiple Pregnancy Risk is Lower for Older Women, 
14(4) J. OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND GENETICS 192-98 (Apr. 1997). Yet another study 
concluded that transferring two embyros instead of three does not reduce pregnancy rates 
significantly, provided that at least one good quality embryo is transferred. Murat Tasdemir et al., 
Two Instead of Three Embryo Transfer in In-Vitro Fertilization, 10(8) HUMAN REPRODUCTION 
2155-58 (Aug. 1995).
348 New Data From CDC Show No Decline in Multiple Births Associated With Advanced Fertility 
Treatment, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 16, 2001 (citing data from THE 1998 CDC REPORT).
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multiples, but further reductions in the number of embryos transferred will likely reduce 
the rate of multiples, based on the research on the optimal number of embryos to transfer.
In November, 1999, the American Society of Reproductive Medicine issued new 
treatment guidelines on the number of embryos to be transferred in IVF procedures.  For 
example, the new guidelines provide that no more than two embryos are to be transferred 
if the patient is 34 or younger and the quality and quantity of embryos is good.349
Reducing the risk of multiples in ovulation induction with clomiphene is less 
precise.  In ovulation induction with IUI,350 the doctor has less control over the 
fertilization process than in IVF.  In all cases, a doctor must monitor the developing 
follicles in order to determine how many will probably reach maturity during the cycle.351
If numerous (e.g., six or more) follicles will mature, various protocols can be used to 
reduce the risk of multiples.  One protocol is to cancel the cycle and try again with a 
lower dose in a future cycle.352  A recent study indicates that, if six or more follicles are 
developing well, canceling the cycle significantly reduces the risk of multiples.353
Another protocol is to extract some of the developing follicles by needle aspiration and 
proceed with the cycle.  
A recent study concluded that the risk of multiples is more effectively controlled 
in IVF than in ovulation induction with IUI.354  The ASRM is currently considering 
whether IVF should be used more widely, instead of ovulation induction, to reduce the 
risk of multiples.355
Ironically, the risk of multiples, especially triplets and higher-order multiples, is 
lower in states that mandate comprehensive insurance coverage of infertility.356  With 
insurance coverage of infertility, there is less financial pressure associated with each 
cycle, so patients are more willing to be treated conservatively.
iii. Other risks to the child or children gestated.
(A) Other medical risks.
For the child or children being gestated, almost all of the medical risks associated 
with fertility treatment are caused by multi-fetal pregnancies357 or by the underlying 
349
 American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Committee Opinion, Guidelines on Number of 
Embryos Transferred (Revised and Amended, Nov. 1999).
350
 The same is true for stimulation by injectable gonadotropins followed by IUI.
351
 Some of the recent, highly publicized multiple births resulted from the use of clomiphene without 
adequate medical monitoring. RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 116.
352
 Even if the doctor cancels the cycle (meaning the doctor stops the ovulation induction drugs, does 
not trigger the release of the follicles with an hCG shot and does not do an IUI), the patient may still 
get pregnant with intercourse, in which case the pregnancy may be a multi-fetal pregnancy.
353
 Richard P. Dickey et al., Relationship of Follicle Numbers and Estradiol Levels to Multiple 
Implantation in 3,608 Intrauterine Insemination Cycles, 75(1) FERTILITY & STERILITY 69 (Jan. 
2001).
354
 McCullough, supra note 141.
355 Id.
356 RESOLVE Responds to New Report on Trends in Multiple Births Following Infertility Treatment, 
PR Newswire, June 22, 2000.
357
 The medical risks of multi-fetal pregnancies  are discussed supra at ______.
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cause of infertility (such as in utero exposure to DES).358  There is no evidence that IVF 
or GIFT increases the risk that the child or children gestated will have birth defects or 
chromosomal abnormalities.359
ICSI, a new type of fertility treatment that was developed about 10 years ago, has 
been found to increase the risk of certain types of chromosomal abnormalities.  Recall 
that ICSI is used in conjunction with IVF, where there is severe male factor infertility.  In 
ICSI, an embryologist or technician injects a single sperm into a single egg.  Using ICSI 
dramatically increases fertilization rates, so it has been hailed as a revolutionary 
treatment for severe male factor infertility.360  In the last few years, ICSI has been used 
much more frequently.  During 1998, for example, ICSI was used in about 40 percent of 
ART cycles.361
From the time it was developed, geneticists expressed concerns that ICSI posed 
two types of potential risks: (1) first, the physical process of injecting a needle into the 
egg to deposit the sperm might cause genetic damage; and (2) second, ICSI may allow a 
father, who has a genetic defect and would not have been able to have children without 
ICSI, to pass that genetic defect on to his child.362  So far, the first problem has not 
materialized; there is no evidence that ICSI increases the risk of birth defects.363  On the 
358 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 138.
359 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 286.  A single Australian study concluded that 
children conceived by IVF and GIFT had increased rates of neurological defects, but the study had 
certain limitations and researchers have subsequently reaffirmed the view that IVF and GIFT do not 
increase the risk of neurological defects.  Id. at 286-87.  The author of HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, a 
geneticist with a Ph.D., cautions that we should continue to monitor children conceived with IVF and 
GIFT in case problems show up years from now.  Id. at 287-89.
360 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 115-16.
361 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF REPRODUCTIVE 
MEDICINE, & RESOLVE, 1998 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 29 (2000)
[hereinafter THE 1998 CDC REPORT].  The rate mentioned is for all ART cycles that involved fresh, 
nondonor eggs or embryos.  Id.
362 Id. at 120-21.
363 Id. at 121 (describing research being conducted in Brussels and New York).  The geneticist author 
of HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION cautions that it is very difficult to detect some defects that are caused by 
minute changes in chromosomes:
[A] problem with these studies is the limited power of the measurements they have 
used to detect genetic defects.  Chromosomal abnormalities are major-sized genetic 
defects.  The human genome contains more than three billion individual pieces 
(nucleotides) of information in its DNA. . . .  ICSI children have been examined for 
loss of chromosomes, additional chromosomes, large-scale scrambling of 
chromosomes, and so on.  These techniques can visualize genetic damage only 
encompassing from millions to tens of millions of nucleotides.  But important 
genetic defects can be caused by much smaller changes.  For example, most people 
with the genetic disease cystic fibrosis have a deletion of only three nucleotides in 
an essential gene.  Trying to observe minute changes like these using chromosomal 
analysis is equivalent to standing on the surface of the moon and using binoculars to 
try to read the license plates of cars on a freeway in Los Angeles. More refined 
techniques do exist to identify genetic defects, but they are only used when we 
know where to look – in other words, when the gene responsible for the condition 
has been identified, as is the case, for example, with cystic fibrosis.
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other hand, studies have concluded that ICSI does increase the risk of various 
chromosomal abnormalities, some of which are extremely serious.364
The great benefit of ICSI is that it can permit men with severe male factor 
infertility to conceive.  The problem is that many different genetic defects can cause male 
factor infertility, and only a few of these problems have been identified.365  Given that 
fact, it is currently impossible to screen for all of the types of genetic defects that the 
father may pass on to the child.366  Some of the sex chromosomal defects will render the 
children infertile, as their fathers were.367  Cystic fibrosis368 and Turner’s Syndrome369
are two of the more serious defects that can be attributable to ICSI.
On the other hand, the vast majority of children born as a result of ICSI are 
normal.  In addition, certain of the risks of ICSI can be reduced.  For example, genetic 
testing of the patient and his partner can detect certain chromosomal abnormalities.370  In 
addition, the risk of transmitting defects carried on the Y chromosome can be reduced, 
but not eliminated, by transferring only female embryos in the IVF procedure.371  A spate 
of recent medical articles recommends genetic counseling and genetic testing for couples 
considering ICSI.
Children of older mothers have a higher risk of certain chromosomal 
abnormalities, even without any fertility treatment.372  For example, the child of a 40-year 
old woman has a 1 in 100 probability of having Downs Syndrome.373  The age of the egg 
determines the age-related risks, so using eggs donated from a younger woman reduces 
these risks.374
Id.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 124-25.
366 Id.
367
 For example, Klinefelter’s Syndrome (having two X chromosomes and a Y chromosome) can be 
passed from a father to a son by ICSI.  The abnormalities cause by Klinefelter’s Syndrome can be 
severe or limited.  About 15 percent of men with Klinefelter’s Syndrome look normal but are 
“mosaics,” meaning that some of their cells have the normal XY chromosomal pattern and other cells 
have the XXY pattern.  HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 122.
368
 Some men do not have the tubes that connect the testes and the urethra.  This abnormality is 
called congenital absence of the vas deferens (CAVD).  Men with CAVD may produce normal 
sperm in the testes but the sperm cannot leave the testes so they cannot fertilize an egg naturally.  
The sperm of men with CAVD can be removed surgically and injected into an egg using ICSI.  The 
problem is that men with CAVD carry the genetic defect that causes cystic fibrosis.  If the egg comes 
from a woman who is also a cystic fibrosis carrier, the child could have a very serious case of cystic 
fibrosis.  Brian Kearney, the author of HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, notes that women can now be 
screened to determine is they are cystic fibrosis carriers, but this genetic test was not available when 
ICSI was first used. He mentions this problem with screening for cystic fibrosis as an example of 
“[t]he risk of using a powerful technology like ICSI without understanding all the underlying disease 
processes.”  HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 126.
369
 Turner’s Syndrome causes a variety of physical abnormalities, as well as heart and kidney 
problems. Id. at 122.
370 Id. at 126.
371 Id.
372 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 149.
373 Id.
374 THE FERTILITY GUIDE, supra note 23, at 143 (1998).
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(B) Potential psychological risks to the child or children.
The first IVF child was born in 1978,375 so researchers have had time to study the 
emotional and psychological development of children conceived through assisted 
reproductive technologies.  Numerous longitudinal studies have concluded that the social 
and emotional development of IVF children is normal.376  Studies have also concluded 
that parents who become parents after fertility treatment parent well.377
That being said, mental health professionals caution that children created through 
fertility treatment, especially third-party treatments like sperm donation, egg donation, or 
surrogacy, may be harmed psychologically if the parents keep the child’s origins a 
secret.378  Secrecy in connection with fertility treatment dates back 100 years to the early 
days of sperm donation.379  Medical doctors thought it would be best for the family and 
children to keep the sperm donation a secret, not realizing the negative impact that such a 
secret could have in the future.380
Mental health professionals were not consulted until fairly recently.  As late as 10 
years ago, a group of international studies indicated that most of the families in the study 
who had resorted to sperm donation had decided not to tell the children.381  As mental 
health professionals have gotten more involved in fertility treatment, they have urged 
parents to be open with their children about their origins.  They have argued that secrets 
can have very negative effects on family dynamics, and on the child who later in life 
discovers the secret, so parents should be forthcoming.382
b. The judgments about fertility treatment that may be affected by 
heuristic biases.
i. The potential for overestimating the chances of success.
Fertility patients need accurate information about their various treatment options 
in order to make informed decisions about their treatment.  In 1992, Congress enacted the 
375 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 12.
376 See, e.g., Susan Golombok et al., The “Test-Tube” Generation:  Parent-Child Relationships and 
the Psychological Well-Being of In Vitro Fertilization Children at Adolescence, 72(2) CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 599 (March-Apr. 2001).
377 See, e.g., Susan Golombok et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies:  
Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66(2) CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 285 (April 1995) (concluding that “the quality of parenting in families with a child 
conceived by assisted conception is superior to that shown by families with a naturally conceived 
child”).
378 CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 350-57 (1998).
379 Id. at 340.
380 Id. at 341.
381 Id. at 343.
382 CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 351 (1998), quoting from Patricia 
Mahlstedt & Dorothy Greenfield, Assisted Reproduction with Donor Gametes: The Need for Patient 
Preparation, FERTILITY & STERILITY (1989).
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Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act.383  This legislation requires the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the CDC) to compile and publish success 
rates for assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatments at hundreds of U.S. fertility 
clinics.384  The CDC works with the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(SART), an organization of fertility doctors, to compile the data.
The most recent report, which was issued in December 2002, is for fertility 
treatment during calendar year 2000.385  The report, 2000 Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Success Rates (the “2000 CDC Report”), includes a report based on national 
data, as well as success rates for 383 specific fertility clinics.  The national data are based 
on information gathered from 99,639 ART cycles in 2000.
The national data indicate a 25.4 percent live birth rate per ART cycle.386  Broken 
down by age of the mother, the live birth rate per cycle was:
(1) 32.8 percent for women ages 34 or younger;
(2) 26.7 percent for women ages 35-37;
(3) 18.5 percent for women ages 38 to 40; and
(4) 10.1 percent for women ages 41-42387
The report further breaks down the live birth rate per cycle for over-forty women.  
For over-forty women, the live birth rate per cycle was:
(1) 15.2 percent for 40-year-old women;
(2) 11.7 percent for 41-year-old women;
(3) 8.1 percent for 42-year-old women;
(4) 5.3 percent for 43-year-old women; and
(5) 2.2 percent for women ages 44 and older.388
Live birth rate per cycle is also broken down based on the infertility diagnosis.  
The various diagnoses had the following live birth rates per cycle:
(1) Male factor: 29.3 percent;
(2) Endometriosis: 28.4 percent;
(3) Ovulatory dysfunction: 28.6 percent;
(4) Tubal factor: 26.7 percent;
(5) Uterine factor: 19.7 percent;
(6) Other identifiable causes: 22 percent; and
(7) Unexplained cause: 28 percent.389
383
 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493, § 1, 106 Stat. 
3146.  For a discussion of the events leading up to the enactment of this law, see HIGH-TECH 
CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 32-33.
384
 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493, § 1, 106 Stat. 
3146.
385 2000 CDC REPORT, supra note 44.
386
 Live birth means “a delivery of one or more living babies.” Id. at 17.
387 Id. at 73.
388 Id. at 23.
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These rates can be considered in relation to the overall probability of a couple 
getting pregnant in one natural cycle with no medical treatment; the pregnancy 
probability is 10 percent or less per cycle.390  On the other hand, this comparison can be 
misleading because couples trying to get pregnant naturally can try every month, but 
couples do not usually go through more than two or three ART cycles in a year because 
of the cost and difficulty involved.391
Instead of focusing on per cycle success rates, infertile patients might want to 
know the cumulative success rates for ART cycles, meaning the end-result success rates 
where the patient goes through multiple, sequential ART cycles.  Geneticist Brian 
Kearney notes:
If high-tech conception were like rolling dice, cumulative success 
rates could be calculated directly from the per cycle success rates.  Every 
time you roll a die, the probability of coming up with any of the numbers 
is 1 in 6 (17 percent).  If you keep rolling, eventually you will come up 
with your target number.  For example, the probability of rolling a six is 
17 percent after a single throw.  After three rolls the probability of rolling 
a six at least once is 43 percent and after eight rolls it is 77 percent.  The 
key here is that the die never changes.  No matter how many times you roll 
it always has six sides, and the probability of rolling any of the numbers 
will always be 1 in 6 for each throw.  If high-tech conception worked the 
same way, a couple would eventually give birth if they started enough 
cycles. . . . The question is whether using high-tech conception is like 
rolling dice.392
Various studies have tried to determine cumulative success rates for IVF, but have 
reached conflicting conclusions.  Some studies have concluded that success rates drop 
sharply after the first failed IVF; others have concluded that success rates stay the same 
for six or more cycles.393  Geneticist Brian Kearney believes these various studies warrant 
some skepticism because of certain methodological limitations of the studies.394  In his 
view, the best study was a study from the U.K. that included data from almost 37,000 
cycles during the years 1991 to 1994.395  That study concluded that “the probability of 
live births per cycle significantly declined with each successive attempt at IVF, even 
when the results were adjusted for the age of the mother.”396  Based on this study, 
Kearney argues:  “In short, IVF is not like rolling dice.  It’s worse.  If a couple doesn’t 
389 Id. at 27.
390 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 26.
391 Id. at 26.
392 Id. at 40-41.
393 Id. at 43.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 43-44.
396 Id. at 44.
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give birth by the fourth attempt, they are unlikely to be successful continuing the same 
treatment and should consider alternatives.”397
Infertile patients may assume, contrary to the conclusion reached in the U.K. 
study, that fertility treatment is like rolling dice and that they will get pregnant and have a 
baby if they just persist with their fertility treatment.  If so, they may overestimate the 
chances of their treatment being successful. They may overestimate their chances of 
success even more if they assume that fertility treatment has cumulative odds like rolling 
dice and they overestimate the odds of success in later individual cycles due to the 
“gambler’s fallacy.”398  For example, they may assume that, with a 20 percent per cycle 
success rate for IVF, their odds of success after four unsuccessful cycles would be much 
higher than 20 percent in their next IVF cycle.
Many other types of medical treatment require patients to make similar 
calculations of their odds of success.  Some of these judgments may be as flawed as some 
of the judgments fertility patients make.  The point for purposes of our discussion is that 
we should encourage fertility patients to consider alternative treatment where a specific 
type of fertility treatment has already failed repeatedly. Specifically, we should
encourage patients to consider egg donor or surrogacy procedures where IVF has failed 
repeatedly.
ii. The potential for underestimating the risk of multi-fetal pregnancies.
Just as fertility patients may overestimate the odds of fertility treatment success, 
they may also underestimate the medical risks of fertility treatment, especially the risks 
associated with multi-fetal pregnancies.  Recall that multi-fetal pregnancies, which are 
more likely with fertility treatment, pose very significant risks for the fetuses and the 
women gestating them.  The more embryos implanted, the more likely it is that the 
pregnancy will be multi-fetal.  Fertility patients nonetheless usually press their doctors to 
397 Id.
398 AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, in
DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES 7 (1999).  
People expect that a sequence of events generated by a random process will 
represent the essential characteristics of the process even when the sequence is 
short.  In considering tosses of a coin for heads or tails, for example, people regard 
the sequence H-T-H-T-T-H to be more likely than the sequence H-H-H-T-T-T, 
which does not appear random, and also more likely than the sequence H-H-H-H-T-
H, which does not represent the fairness of the coin.  Thus, people expect that the 
essential characteristics of the process will be represented, not only globally in the 
entire sequence, but also locally in each of its parts.  [A] consequence of the belief 
in the local representativeness is the well-known gambler’s fallacy.  After observing 
a long run of red on the roulette wheel, … most people erroneously believe that 
black is now due [on the next individual spin], presumably because the occurrence 
of black will result in a more representative sequence than the occurrence of an 
additional red.  Chance is commonly viewed as a self-correcting process in which a 
deviation in one direction induces a deviation in the opposite direction to restore the 
equilibrium.  In fact, deviations are not “corrected,” as a chance process unfolds, 
they are merely diluted.
Id. (reference omitted).
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implant many embryos in order to increase their chances of getting pregnant.  The 
patients often prefer twins to a single child, and are willing to risk a triplet or higher order 
multi-fetal pregnancy.  Fertility patients may not comprehend the magnitude of the 
medical risks of twin or triplet pregnancies, or the difficulty of raising triplets.399
Recall also that it is not clear whether repeated stimulation of a woman’s ovaries 
increases her risk of ovarian cancer.  The studies that have linked ovarian stimulation and 
cancer risk have been discounted due to their methodological limitations, but that does 
not mean that there is definitely no risk.
In a 1997 study, about 80 percent of women requiring fertility treatment indicated 
that they would take ovulation induction drugs even if the drugs increased their risk of 
ovarian cancer slightly.400 The article also notes, however, that only 24 percent of the 
women in the study understood that ovarian cancer is usually fatal.  In addition, fertility 
patients may be assuming that “it won’t happen to me.”401
Of course, other medicines also have side effects.  Viagra, for example, has life 
threatening side effects.402
3. Implications for various types of fertility treatments.403
(a)  Surgical treatment that cures or treats infertility.
Treatments that cure or treat infertility include surgical correction of varicocele, 
blocked fallopian tubes, and endometriosis.  In some case, the benefits of these 
procedures may not be as great as the benefits of IVF, and these procedures have their 
own medical risks.  For example, a woman may be more likely to have an ectopic 
pregnancy after tubal surgery.  On the other hand, these procedures do not run the risks of 
399 HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION, supra note 35, at 282.  Kearney notes that having triplets is more 
difficult than patients realize.  In one study of 11 triplet families, four of the mothers in the study said 
they regretted having triplets.  Id. at 285.
400
 Barry Rosen et al., supra note 326, at 90.
401
 The “it won’t happen to me” bias is described in Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: 
Understanding Perceived Risk, in DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 470 (1999).
Accurate perception of misleading samples of information might also be seen to 
underlie another apparent judgmental bias, people’s predilection to view themselves 
as personally immune from hazards.  The great majority of individuals believe 
themselves to be better than average drivers, more likely than average to live past 
80, less likely than average to be harmed by the products they use, and so on.  
Although such perceptions are obviously unrealistic, the risks look small from the 
perspective of each individual’s experience.  Consider automobile driving:  Despite 
driving too fast, tailgating, etc., poor drivers make trip after trip without mishap.  
This personal experience demonstrates to them their exceptional skill and safety.  
Moreover, their indirect experience via the news media shows them that when 
accidents happen, they happen to others.
Id.
402
 Lisa Thomlinson, Viagra Linked to 17 deaths, THE EVENING STANDARD (LONDON), May 17, 
1999, at 5.
403
 This section draws on many points made earlier in this article, which are not separately footnoted 
when they are mentioned here.
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ovarian stimulation, including the risks of hyperstimulation and multi-fetal pregnancies.  
The costs of the surgical treatment of reproductive diseases and structural abnormalities 
should be treated as medical costs.
(b) Ovarian stimulation with IUI or IVF.
The benefits of ovarian stimulation with IUI or IVF often exceed the benefits of 
surgical treatment.  (The relative benefits depend on the nature of the infertility.)  Patients 
express with their wallets their strong preference for this type of treatment.  The biggest 
countervailing consideration is the large, negative effect on welfare caused by multi-fetal 
pregnancies.  The fertility community and the Centers for Disease Control are developing 
new protocols to reduce the risk of multi-fetal pregnancies, so this risk will likely be 
reduced as treatment protocols evolve.  
The risk of multi-fetal pregnancies will be reduced if IVF is subsidized.  The risk 
of multi-fetal pregnancies is easier to reduce with IVF than with IUI, but IVF is much 
more expensive per cycle.  In addition, where patients have less at stake financially, they 
are more amenable to more conservative treatment that reduces the risk of multi-fetal 
pregnancies.  Ovarian hyperstimulation is another medical risk, but serious cases are rare.  
Researchers have not established that ovarian stimulation causes ovarian cancer, but 
additional research will be done as patients age.  
Another concern is that patients may overestimate the benefits of multiple cycles 
of high-tech treatment and underestimate the risks of treatment, especially the medical 
risks associated with multi-fetal pregnancies.  If patients fail to understand that their 
chances of success decline with each subsequent attempt, as is likely the case, alternative 
treatments that are more effective, such as donor and surrogacy procedures, should be 
encouraged.  The risk of multi-fetal pregnancy should be emphasized in fertility 
treatment counseling, but the subsidy does not need to be reduced to respond to this risk.
In fact, subsidizing fertility treatment ironically reduces the rates of multi -fetal 
pregnancies.
On balance, the cost of this treatment should be treated as a medical expense, 
given the profound desire of patients to increase their chances of conceiving and bearing 
a child and the effect of subsidies on the risk of multi-fetal pregnancies. 
(c) Donor and surrogate procedures.
Collaborative reproduction, with a donor or surrogate, produces very great 
benefits for the parents and child.  Some patients choose to adopt if they cannot have a 
biological or gestational connection to a child, but many patients vastly prefer 
collaborative reproduction to adoption. Also, many parents who would like to adopt 
healthy babies in the U.S. cannot because there is a shortage of such babies. In addition, 
the tax subsidy for adoption is typically more generous than the tax subsidy for the 
medical treatment of infertility, so the tax law favors adoption over collaborative 
reproduction, even if the cost of collaborative reproduction is deductible as a medical 
expense
Egg donation involves medical risks to the donor and the woman who gestates the 
fetus or fetuses.  Ovarian stimulation of an egg donor entails the serious but uncommon 
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risk of hyperstimulation.  Also, an increased risk of ovarian cancer from repeated ovarian 
stimulations is possible but has not been established.  Even if a connection between 
stimulation and ovarian cancer is later made, egg donors are usually stimulated fewer 
times than are fertility patients (often just once) and can reduce their cancer risk by later 
taking oral contraceptives or bearing a child.  The infertile woman could also reduce own 
her risk of ovarian cancer by proceeding with egg donation and bearing a child, which is 
another benefit of the procedure.  (The alternative, taking oral contraceptives to reduce 
ovarian cancer risk, will be unacceptable to most fertility patients.)  The woman who 
gestates runs the risks associated with multi-fetal pregnancies.  
The basic donor fee should be deductible or reimbursible, in part to permit older 
women to conceive and bear a child and, in part, to encourage older women to proceed 
with a more effective alternative to repeated IVF procedures.  The deduction for the fee 
charged by the donor should be capped by statute to prevent the deduction of the 
increased costs of creating a “designer” baby. 
From the perspective of the surrogate, the strongest negative is the medical risk 
associated with multi-fetal pregnancies, but this risk can be reduced.  The cost of a 
surrogacy procedure should be deductible as a medical expense, so that the tax treatment 
of surrogacy costs is less disadvantaged relative to the tax treatment of adoption, and is 
comparable to the tax treatment of IVF procedures.
VI. Conclusion.
The experience of infertility is devastating entails multiple losses.  The treatment 
of infertility is intensely medical and has been appropriately likened to the treatment of 
other chronic illnesses.  Insurance does not typically cover fertility treatment, but under 
current law fertility treatment costs, including the additional costs of surrogacy, are 
“medical expenses” for purposes of the section 213 medical expense deduction. The IRS 
has taken the position that surrogacy expenses are not deductible as medical expenses, 
arguing that surrogacy does not satisfy the second, “structure or function” prong of the 
medical expense definition because the surrogate, not the taxpayer, bears the child.  
Surrogacy costs are medical expenses, however, under the first, “disease or condition” 
prong of the definition.  
Most people conceive and bear children without having to incur expenses for 
fertility treatment.  Some have argued that the costs of fertility treatment should not be 
deductible because people can lead a “normal” life without having children.  On the other 
hand, people who would like to bear a child, but cannot because of a physiological 
condition, are not leading a “normal” life.  Infertility is a loss, just as a broken leg is a 
loss.  Under section 213, the term “medical expense” is defined by reference to a baseline 
of normal biological functioning, which includes reproductive and sexual functioning. 
Expenses incurred to try to return to or approximate the baseline of normal reproductive 
health are deductible, even if the taxpayer winds up “better off,” with a child, after the 
fertility treatment.
Given the existence of the section 213 medical expense deduction, taxpayers also 
should be able to deduct the cost of fertility treatments, including conventional 
treatments, ovarian stimulation with IUI or IVF, and collaborative reproduction with a 
donor or surrogate. They should also be able to deduct the costs of medical care for 
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sexual dysfunction, such as Viagra (which, in many ways, is similar to fertility 
treatment), and medical care that facilitates reproductive choice (which, in some ways, 
presents a tougher case for deductibility under section 213).
Reproduction is extremely important to most people and the elasticity of demand 
of fertility treatment is likely low.  In addition, allowing taxpayers to deduct the costs of 
various types of fertility treatment will: (1) encourage infertile taxpayers to elect the most 
effective treatment option, which in some cases is IVF, an egg donor procedure, or a 
surrogate procedure; and (2) ironically, reduce the rate of risky multi-fetal pregnancies.  
Even if fertility treatment costs are characterized as medical expenses, the tax 
code still favors adoption over fertility treatment, because the medical expense deduction, 
which functions like a co-pay, saves taxpayers less money than the tax credit for adoption 
expenses.
Due to the vital importance of reproduction to most people, fertility treatment 
costs should be deductible under either an “ability-to-pay” or consequentialist normative 
approach.
